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DEEMED LIQUIDATION: A CASE FOR THE STATUTORY
AMENDMENT OF U.S. CUSTOMS LAW GOVERNING THE




The U.S. scheme for the collection of antidumping and countervailing
duties is flawed as administered Imported goods subject to such duties
may be deemed liquidated under 19 U.S. C. Section 1504(d). Deemed
liquidation occurs by operation of law when Customs fails to affirma-
tively liquidate imported goods. The final duty rate is then "deemed" to
be the same as the preliminary duty paid at the time of importation. The
significance of deemed liquidation is that the preliminary duty rate and
the final duty rate, which should have been collected, frequently are dif-
ferent, thereby causing importers to lose money when they have overpaid
duties upon importation and causing the U.S. government to lose money
when importers have underpaid duties. Practically, deemed liquidation
occurs because the Commerce Department and Customs fail to take ac-
tion required by statute or make mistakes in taking such action. The
current statutory scheme does not create incentives for those administra-
tive agencies to take timely action because delay may benefit the U.S.
government. These delays may injure importers and threaten U.S. multi-
lateral trade-relations. The U.S. scheme does not provide an administra-
tive remedy to address the problem and judicial remedies are ineffective.
Therefore, the U.S. trade and customs laws should be amended to (1)
impose mandatory deadlines within which these U.S. agencies must act,
(2) protect importers by imposing negative consequences to the U.S.
government for failure to meet those deadlines, and (3) create an admin-
istrative remedy for importers to protest and undo deemed liquidation
once it has occurred
t The author is an associate with Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C. in Denver, Colo. He is
and has taught as a visiting assistant and adjunct professor of law at the Sturm College of Law at the
University of Denver. The author has represented clients before the U.S. Department of Commerce
and U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Customs in antidumping proceedings and the
liquidation process. The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contributions made to this
article by Professor Jay Brown at the Sturm College of Law, Gregory S. McCue of the law firm
Steptoe & Johnson, Washington, D.C., and his research assistants: Kathryn Garner, Ryan Howell,
Suzanne Meintzer, Pax Moultrie and Thomas Wagner.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRO D UCTION ..................................................................................... 473
1. LEGAL BACKGROUND .................................................................... 476
A. Entry of Goods and Liquidation ................................................. 476
B. Basic Introduction to Antidumping and Countervailing
D uty Proceedings ....................................................................... 477
1. Investigation Phase ................................................................ 478
2. Administrative Review Phase ................................................ 480
3. Judicial Review Phase ........................................................... 481
4. Sample Timeline for Antidumping Proceedings ................... 481
C. Deemed Liquidation Under 19 U.S.C. §1504 ............................ 482
II. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LIQUIDATION
PR O C ESS ......................................................................................... 4 84
A. The Immediate Effects of Antidumping Proceedings and Delay
in the Liquidation Process ........................................................ 484
B. The Immediate Effects of Deemed Liquidation .......................... 488
C. The Sources of the Problems Associated with Deemed
L iquidation ................................................................................. 49 1
D. Pertinent Public Policy Considerations ..................................... 496
III. DEEMED LIQUIDATION AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT .................. 500
IV. POSSIBLE JUDICIAL REMEDIES: INADEQUACY OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS, WRITS OF MANDAMUS, INJUNCTIONS AND
COMPELLING AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE APA .......................... 506
A. D eclaratory Judgm ent ................................................................ 506
B . W rit of M andam us ...................................................................... 507
1. Writ of Mandamus to Compel Customs Action .................... 508
2. Writ of Mandamus to Compel DOC Action .......................... 510
C . Injunctions .................................................................................. 512
D. Compelling Agency Action Under the APA ............................... 513
E. Imposition of Judicial Deadlines ............................................... 515
F. Public Policy Considerations ..................................................... 515
V. THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY AMENDMENT CREATING
DEADLINES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILING TO MEET
T H EM .............................................................................................. 5 17
VI. A CASE FOR THE CREATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY TO
PROTECT AGAINST THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF DEEMED
L IQU IDA TION .................................................................................. 52 1
A. An Administrative Remedy for Importers ................................... 522
B. An Administrative Remedy for Representatives of U.S.
Industry ...................................................................................... 526
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............................................................... 528
[Vol. 83:2
2005] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
INTRODUCTION
Goods imported into the United States are subject to import duties.
For certain goods, the duty liability may include antidumping duties, a
type of "unfair trade" duty.1 Unfair trade duties are statutorily mandated,
imposed by the Department of Commerce ("DOC") and collected by the
U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection ("Customs") through a
process called "liquidation.",2  Importers pay preliminary duties upon
importation. The DOC subsequently determines the final duty liability,
which may be higher than, lower than or the same as the preliminary
duties paid. Customs must liquidate goods within six month of receiving
notice from the DOC of the final duty liability.3 If Customs does not do
so, the goods are "deemed" liquidated at the preliminary duty rate paid
upon importation. The DOC and Customs frequently delay in determin-
ing the final duty liability and liquidating, causing deemed liquidation to
occur.
Deemed liquidation results in a windfall for the importer and a
"loss" for the United States government if the final duty liability is
higher than the preliminary duty paid upon entry. Conversely, deemed
liquidation results in a loss for the importer and a windfall for the U.S.
government if the final duty liability is lower than the preliminary duty
paid upon entry. Deemed liquidation also affects representatives of U.S.
industry in the sense that U.S. industry either gains more or less protec-
tion against unfairly traded foreign imports.
Customs Headquarters Ruling HQ 2282494 illustrates how Cus-
toms' failure to timely liquidate entries may injure an importer and bene-
fit the government. In 1986, an importer imported bricks from Mexico
and paid a preliminary unfair trade duty of 3.51 percent ad valorem.5
The DOC subsequently revoked the unfair trade duty and, in May 1996,
sent instructions to Customs to liquidate the importer's entries of bricks
at zero percent duty. Customs failed to do so and discovered in July
1998, approximately twenty-five months after receiving notice of the
final duty liability, that the goods were deemed liquidated at the 3.51
1. For purposes of this article, the processes for the collection of antidumping and counter-
vailing duties are essentially the same. For simplicity's sake, this article discusses collection of
antidumping duties only.
2. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2005).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
4. U.S. Customs Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 228249 (Aug. 23, 1999), available at HQ
228249 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Cust. HQ 228249].
5. Many of the facts involved in Customs transactions are confidential. Therefore, it is
frequently impossible to find out the monetary value at stake in a given situation. In Cust. HQ
228249, the importer paid a preliminary unfair trade duty of 3.51 percent ad valorem. Id Assume
that the importer imported bricks worth $10 million. The importer would then have paid $351,000
in unfair trade duties. Because the DOC subsequently revoked the unfair trade duty, the importer
should have received a $351,000 refund. Instead, deemed liquidation occurred and prevented the
refund. Consequently, the importer would have lost $351,000.
473
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
percent duty paid upon entry. Despite the fact that Customs' own delay
in liquidating the entries caused the negative outcome for the importer,
Customs rejected the importer's argument that it was entitled to a refund
of the 3.51 percent duty paid upon entry. As a result, the U.S. govern-
ment benefited from its own failure to liquidate in a timely manner be-
cause it was not forced to refund the overpaid duties while the importer
lost money it was entitled to have refunded.
This article argues that the current liquidation scheme is flawed as
administered. The problems associated with the scheme stem from the
failure of administrative agencies to act in a timely manner, the lack of
consequences in the statutory scheme for such failure to act, and the lack
of an administrative remedy for interested parties to undo deemed liqui-
dation once it has occurred. As a result, unfairly traded goods are arbi-
trarily exposed to over- and under-enforcement of U.S. unfair trade laws.
This exposure has considerable implications for the business com-
munity, both domestically and internationally, and potentially jeopard-
izes U.S. relations with multi-lateral trading partners. 6  U.S. trade and
customs laws reflect benefits and obligations that the United States has
carefully bargained for in multilateral trade negotiations. Administrative
failure in implementing these international obligations may negate bene-
fits resulting from years of negotiations between a large number of coun-
tries. At stake are substantial amounts of money 7 and importers' and
6. Prior to 1978, there was no time limit within which liquidation had to occur. S. REP. NO.
95-778, at 31 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2211,2242 [hereinafter S. REP.]. Congress
imposed such a time limit, partly motivated by requests from U.S. trading partners.
The committee notes that several of the countries participating in the multilateral Trade
Negotiations have requested that the United States establish a time limit within which
liquidation must occur. The committee has approved the limitations on liquidation with
these requests in mind and expects appropriate compensation in the MTN for this action
by the United States.
Id. at 32. Similarly today, recent focus on the liquidation process in courts and before Customs and
the substantial amounts of unliquidated entries in high-profile U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty proceedings make it likely that U.S. trading partners will pay close attention to the U.S. liquida-
tion process in the future. Problems arising may be subject to discussion in trade negotiations or
before international dispute settlement tribunals.
7. The monetary significance of problems in the liquidation process is evident. In 2004,
goods worth approximately $1,400 billion were imported into the United States. Press Release, U.S.
Dept. of Com., U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services: Aug. 2005 (Oct. 13, 2005), at 6,
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current-press-release/ft900.pdf. All of those
goods must be liquidated at some point in time. Of course, errors in the liquidation process play the
most significant role for entries of goods subject to unfair trade duties. Only a certain percentage of
total imports is subject to unfair trade duties. The author has been unable to obtain relevant statistics
on the liquidation process despite attempts under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2000). One approximation for the amount of goods subject to unfair trade duties are the distribu-
tions of collected unfair trade duties made to U.S. industry under the Continued Dumping and Sub-
sidy Offset Act (CDSOA) of 2000, Pub. L. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675c
(2000)) ("Byrd Amendment"). Customs distributed $231 million in 2001, $330 million in 2002 and
$293 million in 2003. Letter from Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Bill
Thomas, Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means (Mar. 2, 2004),
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfrn?index=5130&sequence=0 [hereinafter Eakin Letter]. The distri-
butions for 2004 are projected to be $300 million. Id. at 4. In addition, the value of unliquidated
goods far exceeds the amounts distributed. For example, goods subject to the most recent U.S. trade
case against softwood lumber from Canada were imported in the amount of $6 billion in 2001.
Softwood Lumber from Canada, USITC Pub. 3509, Invs. Nos. 701-TA-414 & 731-TA-928 (Final),
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foreign countries' faith in the fundamental fairness of the U.S. interna-
tional trade system. The United States also risks losing trade concessions
in future multi-lateral trade negotiations or in World Trade Organization
("WTO") dispute settlement proceedings.8 U.S. trade laws are perceived
to be prejudiced against foreign imports and biased for U.S. industry.
Therefore, errors in the administration of these laws leading to negative
consequences for foreign imports inevitably lead to speculation about the
good faith of Congress and U.S. administrative agencies in implementing
U.S. international trade obligations. To remedy these problems, this arti-
cle proposes that the U.S. statutes governing the determination and col-
lection of unfair trade duties should be amended to prevent the negative
consequences caused by arbitrary delay in the administrative process.
Most importantly, the applicable statutes should be changed to prevent
the government from benefiting from its own nonfeasance.
Part I of this article provides a description of the legal framework
surrounding the entry of goods, antidumping proceedings and liquida-
tion. Part II discusses the problems associated with the liquidation proc-
ess in the context of goods subject to unfair trade duties, highlighting
how the U.S. government stands to gain from its failure to follow statuto-
rily mandated procedures. Part III analyzes the legislative history of the
deemed liquidation provision and its interpretation by courts. This part
argues that in order to fully implement congressional intent to protect
importers, the negative consequences of deemed liquidation should only
be applied against the U.S. government. Part IV provides an overview of
the potentially available judicial remedies to correct errors in the liquida-
tion process. The remedies include declaratory judgments, writs of man-
damus, injunctions and court-orders compelling agency action under
Section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). 9 This
section asserts that these remedies are inadequate because: (1) they are
unable to undo deemed liquidation once it has occurred, (2) they cause
additional delay and (3) they are costly to implement. Because the U.S.
government's delays are within its exclusive control, forcing importers to
bear this additional burden is inconsistent with congressional concern
IV-2, Table IV-1 (May 2002). The U.S. government has collected some $3 billion in preliminary
unfair trade duties on entries of softwood lumber from Canada since 2001. Canadian Lumber
Groups Discuss Resumption of Talks with U.S., INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 12, 2004 § 46; see, e.g.,
Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,062, 56,077
(Nov. 6, 2001); Notice of Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, Preliminary
Affirmative Critical Circumstances Determination, and Alignment of Final Countervailing Duty
Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
From Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,186, 43,215 (Aug. 17, 2001). None of these entries has been liqui-
dated yet. The softwood lumber case illustrates the large amounts of money at risk of potential
administrative failure. The softwood lumber case is but one example of the myriad of foreign prod-
ucts subject to unfair trade duties for which the U.S. government has collected preliminary unfair
trade duties. Thus, the total amount of money involved is staggering.
8. The author intends to further develop any WTO aspects of deemed liquidation in a subse-
quent article.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).
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with the protection of importers. Part V discusses the necessity for
prompt administrative action in providing notice of the final duty liabil-
ity. Currently, the statutory provisions are directory rather than manda-
tory.' ° This article argues that statutorily imposed deadlines with nega-
tive consequences for the U.S. government for failure to meet them are
necessary because the delays are within the exclusive control of the gov-
ernment. Finally, Part VI argues that the U.S. trade laws should provide
for a speedy administrative remedy to resolve the deemed liquidation
problem. Currently, it appears that deemed liquidation cannot be pro-
tested before it has occurred and cannot be undone thereafter." Instead,
the statutes should be changed to allow importers a way to protest or
reserve their rights before deemed liquidation occurs.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Entry of Goods and Liquidation
Importers bring goods into the United States through a process
called "entry" of goods.' 2 During the entry process, the importer 13 files
certain documents with Customs containing information about the goods
entered, such as value and classification. 14 The information about value
and classification determines the duties assessed on the goods.15 At the
10. See, e.g., Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Cana-
dian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
11. Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. In the majority of cases, courts
and Customs have stated that deemed liquidation cannot be protested or undone. See, e.g., Wolff
Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998); United States v. Cherry Hill
Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 110
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000), aff'd, 283 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); U.S. Customs
Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 228929 (Sept. 27, 2002), available at HQ 228929 (Westlaw) [here-
inafter Cust. HQ 228929]; U.S. Customs Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 228712 (May 13, 2002),
available at HQ 228712 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Cust. HQ 228712]. However, in two recent cases,
the Court of International Trade ("CIT") has indicated in dicta that deemed liquidation possibly
could be protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States, 350
F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1178-79 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d
1357, 1362 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In Norsk Hydro, the Court
of International Trade also indicated that under certain, limited circumstances there might be an
administrative remedy available to importers to undo deemed liquidation once it had occurred.
NorskHydro, 350 F. Supp. 2d. at 1178-79.
12. For purposes of this article, an "entry" of goods refers to goods properly imported into the
U.S. customs territory for consumption (i.e., for use or sale) under the "formal entry" procedure. 19
C.F.R. § 141 .Oa (2005). Customs defines "entry" not merely as the arrival of goods at the port, but
as the process of presenting documentation for clearing goods through Customs. U.S. CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 3,
http://www.customs.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/trade/usimportrequirements.ctt/usim
portrequirements.doc [hereinafter U.S. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS]; 19 C.F.R. § 141.Oa (2005).
13. Frequently, importers hire customs brokers to work through the entry process. A "cus-
toms broker" is defined as "a person who is licensed . . . to transact customs business on behalf of
others." 19 C.F.R. § 111.1 (2005); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1641(a)(1) (2000) (defining a customs
broker as a "person granted a customs broker's license").
14. 19 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 141.90(b)-(c) (2005); 19 C.F.R. § 142.6(a)(3)-
(4) (2005).
15. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000). Goods are classified according to their characteristics
into what is popularly referred to as "HTS numbers." See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES 59 (2002) http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/
toolbox/publications/trade/iius.ctt/iius.doc [hereinafter IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES]. The
HTS numbers are derived from the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("USHTS")
2005] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 477
time of entry, the importer usually pays estimated duties based on the
classification and value asserted in the entry documentation.1 6 Customs
later determines the final duty liability through a process called "liquida-
tion., 17 During liquidation, Customs reviews the information submitted
in the entry documentation to determine the proper classification and
value, and hence the duty liability, of a particular entry.1 8  If Customs
agrees with the information submitted in the entry documentation, it will
liquidate the entry at the duty liability asserted in the entry documenta-
tion.' 9 However, Customs may find that the preliminary duty liability
asserted at the time of entry was either underestimated or overestimated.
In those situations, Customs sends the importer a bill for the additional
duties owed or a refund, as the case may be.20 The importer has the op-
portunity to challenge Customs' determination of its final duty liability
by filing a protest with Customs.
21
As discussed in the following part, certain goods are subject to un-
fair trade duties.22  Unfair trade duties are imposed above and beyond
that which is provided for in the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule
("USHTS").23 The DOC determines the amount of the unfair trade duty
after entry but before Customs' liquidation. All goods are subject to
liquidation regardless of whether they also are subject to unfair trade
duties.
B. Basic Introduction to Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Pro-
ceedings
The DOC is responsible for determining whether foreign goods are
unfairly traded in the United States.2 4 The two principal unfair trade
actions are antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. In anti-
dumping proceedings, the DOC investigates whether a foreign company
which is turn is derived from the international Harmonized System. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2000);
Customs Regulations Amendments To Conform With Harmonized System of Tariff Classification,
53 Fed. Reg. 51244 (Dec. 21, 1988) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. ch. I). The HTS number corre-
sponds to a particular duty rate. For example, if you want to import a grand piano you will find that
it appears to be classified under HTS number 9201.20.00 and that it is subject to a 4.7 percent duty
rate. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES § XVIII
ch. 92, 2 (2004), http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/archive/2004/basic/bychapter/0400C92.pdf.
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(a) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 141.101 (2005); U.S. IMPORT REQUIREMENTS,
supra note 12, at 5.
17. See 19 U.S.C. § 1500(c) (2000). Liquidation is defined as the "final computation or
ascertainment of the duties or drawback accruing on an entry." 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2005).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (2000); IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 59.
19. See id. at 59.
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 159.6(c) (2005); see U.S. IMPORT
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 12, at 6.
21. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2000).
22. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1673 (2000).
23. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671e(a)(3), 1673e(a)(3) (2000).
24. The International Trade Commission ("ITC") and the DOC are the two administrative
agencies involved in the determination of whether unfair trade duties should be imposed. 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671, 1673, 1677(1)-(2) (2000). Unfair trade duties can only be imposed if the ITC concludes
that the dumping or subsidization either injures a domestic industry or materially retards the estab-
lishment of one. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1673(2) (2000).
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is engaged in "dumping," i.e. selling its products in the U.S. market for
less than it sells them in its home (domestic) market.25 In countervailing
duty proceedings, the DOC investigates whether a foreign government is
subsidizing the production of goods, thereby conferring a benefit on the
foreign producers allowing them an unfair advantage over their U.S.
competition.26 If the DOC finds dumping or subsidization, it imposes an
antidumping or countervailing duty on the foreign goods as they cross
the U.S. border to make up the difference in price or cost.27 For the sake
of simplicity, this article discusses the trade action and liquidation proc-
esses for antidumping duties only, as the processes are similar for entries
subject to antidumping and countervailing duty findings. This subsection




The U.S. antidumping laws are retrospective in nature. During an
antidumping investigation, the DOC determines how much dumping
occurred during a particular period of investigation (usually one year)
prior to the initiation of the investigation. 29  The dumping which oc-
curred during that period will be reflected in the cash deposits (equiva-
lent to the dumping margin) required for any future entries of goods.3°
The U.S. antidumping statutes do not impose antidumping duties on
goods entered during the period of investigation. Rather, the dumping
found during the period of investigation determines the cash deposit rate
to be collected on goods entered after the DOC's affirmative preliminary
determination.31
25. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673e(a), 1677(34)-(35) (2000); see also U.S. INT'L TRADE
COMM'N, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY HANDBOOK 1-3 (10th ed. 2002),
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/webpubs.htm (follow hyperlink to article) [hereinafter AD & CVD
HANDBOOK].
26. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1671e(a), 1677(5) (2000); see also AD & CVD HANDBOOK at I-
3.
27. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a), 1671e(a), 1673e(a) (2000). For example, in an antidumping
proceeding, if Foreign Corporation A sells widgets in its home market for 10 dollars (referred to as
normal value) and sells the same widgets in the U.S. market for 5 dollars (referred to as export
price), the dumping margin is 5 dollars (normal value minus export price) or 100 percent. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673 (2000).
28. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(a) (2005).
29. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.204(b) (2005).
30. 19 C.F.R. § 351.21 l(b)(l)-(2) (2005). Cash deposits are the equivalent of safety deposits:
the DOC requires importers suspected of dumping to pay a deposit of preliminary duties upon im-
portation to make sure that there is money from which to collect the final duty liability once the
DOC makes the final determination, often several years after importation.
31. 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.205(a), 351.21 l(b)(l)-(2) (2005). An importer also may choose to post
a bond to ensure payment of antidumping duties. 19 C.F.R. § 351.205(a) (2005). After the DOC
issues an antidumping order (which occurs after a final, affirmative determination), an importer may
not post a bond and must instead post cash deposits. 19 C.F.R. § 351.211 (a) (2005). The difference
between a bond and cash deposits is that a bond is similar to an insurance premium where the im-
porter pays a third-party to insure against the potential increase in duties while the cash deposits
consist of an ad valorem payment of estimated duties (i.e. X percent of the value of the imported
goods).
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Generally, the DOC initiates an antidumping investigation after re-
ceiving a petition for relief from unfairly traded imports from representa-
tives of U.S. industry.3 z An antidumping investigation is divided into a
preliminary and a final phase.33 During the preliminary phase, the DOC
relies on financial and market information submitted by the parties. 34 If
the DOC finds dumping, it publishes its preliminary results in the Federal
Register and instructs Customs to "suspend liquidation" and collect
"cash deposits" on goods entered after the date of the preliminary deter-
mination. 35 The suspension of liquidation is necessary due to the retroac-
tive nature of the U.S. antidumping laws because it prevents Customs
from prematurely liquidating entries before the DOC has determined the
actual duty liability during what is known as an "administrative re-
view. ' 36  The "cash deposit" is the amount of dumping duty found to
have existed during the period of investigation. 37 The cash deposits col-
lected on goods imported after the DOC's affirmative, preliminary de-
termination do not represent the amount by which those goods were ac-
tually dumped. Rather, the cash deposits represent the dumping which
occurred for goods previously imported during the period of investiga-
tion as an approximation of the dumping expected to occur thereafter.
In the final phase of the investigation, the DOC verifies the infor-
mation submitted by the parties during the preliminary phase and makes
necessary revisions to the preliminary duty rate. 38 If the final determina-
tion is affirmative, the DOC publishes the final results (including the
final dumping margin) in the Federal Register and issues instructions to
Customs to continue the suspension of liquidation of past entries and to
collect cash deposits on future entries in the amount of the final dumping
margin. 39 An affirmative final determination results in an antidumping
order.40 An antidumping order remains in effect until revoked. 4' Liqui-
dation remains suspended until the DOC completes an administrative
review (or fails to initiate one).
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (2000). The DOC may also sua sponte initiate an antidumping
investigation. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (2000).
33. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b, 1673d (2000); AD & CVD HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 11-3.
34. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(a) (2005).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d), (f) (2000); AD & CVD HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at 11-13;
IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 101. The cash deposit does not represent
the actual margin at which the imported goods subject to it are dumped. The actual dumping margin
of the goods subject to the cash deposit will be determined in a subsequent administrative review.
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.21 l(b)(3) (2005).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(l)(B) (2000).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.307 (2005).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(1), (d) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.211 (2005). If the DOC's final
determination is negative, i.e., finding no dumping during the period of investigation, the DOC will
publish the results in the Federal Register and instruct Customs to terminate the suspension of liqui-
dation and to refund the cash deposits. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (2000).
40. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(c)(2); 1673e(a) (2000).
41. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (2000); 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.222, 351.211(a) (2005). The DOC may
revoke an antidumping order based on absence of dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(d) (2000). The DOC
and ITC also conduct so called "sunset" reviews every five years after the institution of an order to
determine whether the order should "sunset" or if it needs to stay in effect longer. 19 U.S.C. §
1675(c), (d) (2000).
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2. Administrative Review Phase
The DOC determines the actual dumping margin for entries made
after the preliminary determination in the investigation phase during
what is known as administrative reviews.42 The DOC does not conduct
administrative reviews automatically; a party must request one.43 During
the administrative review, the DOC determines the actual dumping mar-
gin by examining financial information for each entry of goods an im-
porter has made since the imposition of the cash deposits.44 The time
period from the preliminary determination in the investigation to the ini-
tiation of the administrative review constitutes the period of review for
the first administrative review after imposition of the antidumping or-
der.45 Liquidation of the covered entries remains suspended during the
administrative review.4 6 The dumping margin found in an administrative
review constitutes the actual dumping margin for the entries subject to
the original investigation (the final, actual duty liability). This final
dumping margin serves as the final duty liability for the covered entries
and as the cash deposit rate for any entries made after the date of the
final results of the administrative review.47
After concluding an administrative review, the DOC publishes the
final results in the Federal Register, notifies Customs Headquarters that
suspension of liquidation has been lifted, and instructs Customs to liqui-
date the covered entries at the final antidumping duty rate determined in
the administrative review.48 Customs Headquarters, in turn, instructs the
different Customs ports to liquidate the covered entries at the duty rate
determined by the DOC. Finally, the individual Customs ports liquidate
the entries, in one of three ways: (1) if the final duty liability deter-
mined in the administrative review is lower than the cash deposits col-
lected, Customs will refund the difference; 49 (2) if the final duty liability
determined in the administrative review is higher than the cash deposits
collected, Customs will issue a bill for the difference;5° finally, (3) if the
cash deposit is the same as the final duty liability determined in the ad-
ministrative review, no money is due or refunded. 51
42. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2000). Administrative reviews are initiated in the anniversary
month ofantidumping orders. Id.
43. Id. The entries in question will be liquidated at the final dumping margin found in the
original investigation if no party requests an administrative review. 19 C.F.R. § 351.212(c)(1)(i)
(2005).
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B), (a)(2) (2005).
45. The DOC will conduct a new administrative review every year after the imposition of the
antidumping order for as long as the order remains in effect (if requested). The period of review for
the second and all subsequent administrative reviews consists of the twelve month period preceding
the anniversary month of the antidumping order. 19 C.F.R. § 351.213(e) (2005).
46. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.221(b)(6) (2005).
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(c) (2000).
48. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 351.221(b)(5)-(6) (2005).
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3. Judicial Review Phase
An interested party 52 may appeal the DOC's final determinations in
antidumping proceedings to the Court of International Trade ("CIT")
within thirty days of publication of the result in the Federal Register.
53
The DOC is required to publish notice of the CIT's decision in the Fed-
eral Register within ten days of the decision's issuance. 4 The DOC also
instructs Customs to liquidate the entries according to the CIT's deci-
sion.55 The administrative suspension of liquidation in effect during in-
vestigations and administrative reviews ceases to be in effect after the
conclusion of an administrative review. 6 Consequently, Customs may
liquidate entries subject to an appeal even though the final duty liability
has not yet been reviewed by the CIT. To prevent such premature liqui-
dation, the appealing party usually requests a court-ordered suspension of
liquidation in the form of an injunction lasting through the appeals proc-
ess.57 A court-ordered suspension of liquidation is lifted when the time
for appeal of the court decision has expired.
58
4. Sample Timeline for Antidumping Proceedings
59
The following is an example of how an antidumping proceeding
progresses.6 ° If an antidumping investigation is initiated on January 1,
2005, the period of investigation might consist of the year 2004. The
DOC would examine entries of the product under investigation made
during 2004 to see whether they were dumped. Sometime in May 2005
the DOC would issue its preliminary determination. Assuming that the
DOC found that entries made during 2004 were dumped at a margin of
fifteen percent, the DOC would direct Customs to collect cash deposits
of fifteen percent on all entries made subsequent to that date (i.e. May
2005) and also suspend liquidation for those entries. Sometime in Au-
gust 2005 the DOC would issue its final determination. Assume that the
52. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A) (2000) (defining "interested party" to include both representa-
tives of U.S. and foreign industry).
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) (2000). An appellant in effect has sixty days to file the appeal: it
must file the summons within thirty days of publication of the DOC's determination and the com-
plaint within thirty days of filing the summons. Id. Keep in mind that a party may appeal aspects of
the DOC's determinations in both the investigation and administrative review. Therefore, it is not
certain that the CIT's decision will result in a final dumping margin suitable for liquidation. For
purposes of this article, it is assumed that the CIT's decision results in a final duty determination.
54. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e) (2000).
55. Id.
56. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.221 (b)(6) (2005).
57. See, e.g., SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1330-35 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (holding that a preliminary injunction suspending liquidation is effective from date of issuance
to completion of any appellate proceedings).
58. See, e.g., Peer Chain Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359-60 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (finding that the suspension of liquidation was lifted after the time for appealing a decision of
the Federal Circuit (filing a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court) had expired).
59. Countervailing Investigations Timeline, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351, Annex VI (2005); Antidump-
ing Investigations Timeline, 19 C.F.R. pt. 351, Annex VII (2005).
60. Please note that this is a very simplified description of the process and that it does not take
into account potential extensions of time and judicial appeals.
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DOC in its final determination found that the dumping margin for 2004
was twenty percent. The DOC would issue an antidumping order some
time in October 2005.61 The order would instruct Customs to collect
antidumping duties of twenty percent on all entries from that date and to
continue to suspend liquidation on all entries made after the preliminary
determination in May 2005.62
Approximately one year after the final order in October 2005, an in-
terested party could request that the DOC conduct an administrative re-
view. During the review, the DOC would examine at what rate the en-
tries of goods made after the preliminary determination in the investiga-
tion (i.e. May 2005) through the initiation of the administrative review
(i.e. October 2006) actually were dumped. The DOC would issue its
final results some time in October 2007. Assume that the DOC finds that
the actual dumping margin for the period of review is thirty percent.
Then, the DOC would inform Customs that suspension of liquidation for
entries made between May 2005 and October 2006 has been lifted and
direct Customs to liquidate those entries at the dumping margin found in
the administrative review, i.e. thirty percent. The DOC would also in-
form Customs to continue the suspension of liquidation of entries made
after October 2006 and to collect cash deposits of thirty percent on all
entries made after October 2007. The DOC will conduct administrative
reviews every year, if requested, until the antidumping order is revoked.
Thus, some time in October 2007, the DOC could initiate an administra-
tive review of entries made between October 2006 and October 2007.
As illustrated, an importer who imported goods in May 2005 will
learn in October 2007, at the earliest, the final duty liability for those
goods. This time period would be longer if the schedules for the investi-
gation and/or the administrative review were extended or if there were
intervening judicial reviews. In addition, the importer also must wait for
Customs to liquidate the entries in question which might take months and
even years. During this lengthy time period, almost a minimum of three
years, the importer must take into account the uncertain duty liability in
its business model and financial records.
C. Deemed Liquidation Under 19 U.S.C. §1504
Deemed liquidation occurs as a consequence of Customs' failure to
liquidate a particular entry within a statutorily set deadline.63 Deemed
liquidation may occur for all entries, regardless of whether they are sub-
61. Provided that the ITC issues an affirmative finding of injury.
62. Even though the final dumping margin in the investigation was higher than the prelimi-
nary margin, Customs will not collect the difference because the preliminary rate is capped under the
statute. 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a)(1) (2000). Had the final dumping margin been lower than the prelimi-
nary rate, Customs would have refunded the difference. 19 U.S.C. § 1673f(a)(2) (2000).
63. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (2000).
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ject to antidumping duties.64 According to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d), entries
which have been subject to a statutorily imposed or court-ordered sus-
pension of liquidation as a result of an antidumping proceeding, are
deemed liquidated if Customs fails to liquidate them within six months
after receiving notice that the suspension of liquidation has been re-
moved.65
Customs and courts have taken inconsistent positions regarding the
moment when the six-month time period in Section 1504 begins. The
timing of notice is crucial as it may determine whether deemed liquida-
tion has occurred. Customs has consistently argued that the six-month
time period begins when the DOC issues liquidation instructions to Cus-
toms. 66  The DOC sends liquidation instructions in e-mails to Customs
Headquarters. 67 These instructions may be public or non-public. 68 Cus-
toms Headquarters then issues liquidation instructions to its different
Customs ports.69  The Customs ports liquidate the entries and post the
liquidation notice on their bulletin boards.7° Customs argues that its role
in the antidumping enforcement procedure is ministerial only.71 Accord-
ing to Customs, it merely mechanically applies the dumping margin de-
termined by the DOC and, therefore, cannot act until the DOC instructs it
to do so.
The courts, however, have found that the time period should be
measured, at the latest, from the publication in the Federal Register of the
final results in an antidumping administrative review or the final results
64. The statutory deadlines for deemed liquidation vary depending on whether the particular
entries are subject to a dumping finding. Compare § 1504(a) (for entries not subject to an antidump-
ing finding, "an entry of merchandise not liquidated within 1 year from... the date of entry of such
merchandise.., shall be deemed liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duties
asserted by the importer of record."), with § 1504(d) (for entries subject to an antidumping finding,
"[a]ny entry ... not liquidated... within 6 months after receiving ... notice shall be treated as
having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time of
entry ... ").
65. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
66. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
67. Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270.
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b) (2000). See, e.g., Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) (non-public email
instructions).
69. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1316.
70. Id. at 1317.
71. See, e.g., id at 1324 ("Customs' role in making antidumping decisions ... is generally
ministerial .... "); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1273 ("The government argues that because Customs
acts in a ministerial capacity when liquidating antidumping duties, the suspension of liquidation
cannot be removed until Customs has all the information it needs to perform its ministerial task...
."); Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004)
(citing Yacheng Baolong Biochemical Prods. Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2003)) ("In implementing the instructions of Commerce to liquidate entries subject to an
antidumping or countervailing duty order, Customs' actions are ministerial in nature."); Am. Hi-Fi
Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1340, 1342 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) ("[Customs] con-
tends ... that interest assessed on antidumping duties is not protestable ... as Customs does not
make any 'decisions,' but performs merely a ministerial role .... "); U.S. Customs Headquarters
Ruling Letter HQ 230339 (June 25, 2004), available at HQ 230339 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Cust. HQ
230339] ("[Customs] role in the antidumping process is simply to follow Commerce's instructions..
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after judicial review.72 According to the courts, publication provides a
public and unambiguous date from which to measure the six-month time
period.73 In the absence of publication, Customs may receive notice of
the removal of the suspension of liquidation also through public, unam-
biguous liquidation instructions from the DOC to Customs (actual no-
tice) 74 and by participating directly in the underlying litigation, in cases
involving judicial review.75
II. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LIQUIDATION PROCESS
A. The Immediate Effects of Antidumping Proceedings and Delay in the
76Liquidation Process
The time between entry of goods and the determination of final duty
liability through liquidation can be substantial. For goods subject to an-
tidumping investigations, in the best-case-scenario, liquidation will occur
approximately two-and-one-half years after importation.77 The length of
the process increases significantly if it also involves judicial review.
72. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (inter-
preting post-Uruguay Round Agreements Act ("URAA") statute); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United
States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1277 (interpreting pre-
URAA statute). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently decided the issue of whether
the statutory amendments made to Section 1504(d) in 1994 as a result of the enactment of the
URAA, which implemented U.S. WTO obligations, changed this analysis. Congress added the
clause: "[e]xcept as provided in section 1675(a)(3) of this title" to the beginning of the sub-section in
the 1994-version of Section 1504(d). The URAA also added a brand new section 1675(a)(3) to title
19 of the United States Code which provides that:
If the administering authority orders any liquidation of entries pursuant to a review under
paragraph (1), such liquidation shall be made promptly and, to the greatest extent practi-
cable, within 90 days after the instructions to Customs are issued. In any case in which
liquidation has not occurred within that 90-day period, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall, upon the request of the affected party, provide an explanation thereof.
19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(B). The U.S. Government took the position that the addition of this clause
removed the consequence of deemed liquidation from all entries falling under § 1675(a)(3). Int'l
Trading, 412 F.3d at 1306-07. According to the government, the only consequence attaching to
Customs' failure to liquidate within 90 days is that the importer is entitled to ask the Secretary of the
Treasury for an explanation of the delay. Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1268 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004). The CAFC rejected these arguments in the second round of Int'l Trad-
ing cases and followed its precedent in the first round oflnt'l Trading cases. See Int'l Trading, 412
F.3d at 1308-09.
73. Int'l Trading, 421 F.3d at 1308; Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1380; Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at
1275.
74. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381; NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d
1340, 1341 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (holding that Customs received actual notice of the removal of
suspension of liquidation through e-mail instructions from the DOC to Customs despite the fact that
the DOC failed to publish the final results after judicial review).
75. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1370.
76. This article does not purport to provide a full analysis of the economic effects of anti-
dumping proceedings and the liquidation process. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this
article.
77. See, e.g., Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) (non-public email instructions).Cemex, 384 F.3d at
1316-17 (importation between 1991 and 1992; final results of judicial review in April 1998; DOC
issued liquidation instructions in March 1998; Customs liquidated in April 2001); Fujitsu Gen. Am.,
Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (importation in 1986 to 1988; DOC
published final results after administrative review in February 1991; final results after judicial re-
view in October 1996; DOC published final results after judicial review in September 1997; DOC
issued liquidation instructions in September 1997; Customs liquidated between November 1997 and
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There are three main actors who are affected by the length of the
liquidation process: the U.S. government, representatives of U.S. indus-
try and importers. The length of the liquidation process has little impact
on the U.S. government because the government will collect the final
duty liability or refund over-paid duties at some point.
Analyzing the effects on U.S. industry is more complicated. Before
doing so, it is useful to briefly consider the nature of U.S. unfair trade
laws and the characteristics and motivations of the two disputing parties
in an antidumping proceeding.78 Although the DOC has the power to
initiate such proceedings sua sponte, most are initiated after a petition by
representatives of U.S. industry. 79 Representatives of U.S. industry are
referred to as petitioners. Companies on the "defendant" side of the dis-
pute are called respondents. It is imperative to understand that the peti-
tioner and respondent sides do not necessarily consist of one group of
U.S. companies versus a group of foreign companies. The particular
U.S. industry may consist of foreign-owned companies.8° Conversely,
respondent companies may be owned by U.S. owners. Hence, these
trade disputes are rarely of a de facto "us-and-them" character. The mo-
tivating factor behind filing a petition for trade relief is to close the U.S.
market to import competition. The effect of a successful petition is to
make foreign imports more expensive when sold in the U.S. market.
Thus, antidumping proceedings serve as a form of WTO-consistent pro-
tectionism. 81  Not surprisingly, U.S. trade laws are more favorable to
petitioners than to respondents.8 z
February 1998); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270-71 (importation in 1993 and 1994; DOC published
final results after administrative review in February 1996; DOC issued liquidation instructions in
August 1996; Customs liquidated in October 1996); Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 191 F.3d
1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (importation in 1979; DOC published final results after administrative
review in January 1985; final results after judicial review in August 1989; DOC issued liquidation
instructions in October 1989; Customs liquidated in April 1994); Peer Chain Co. v. United States,
316 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359-60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (importation in 1985 and 1986; final results
after administrative review in September 1992; final decision after judicial review in January 1996
(not published); DOC issued non-public liquidation instructions in May 2000; Customs liquidated in
June and August 2000); Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1119-21 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(importation between 1980 and 1982; liquidation suspended pending final duty determination, 1980-
1982; court-ordered injunctions maintaining suspension of liquidation, 1983-1985; liquidation in
1986); LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 668, 670-72 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997)
(importation from 1984 to 1988; suspension of liquidation between 1984 and 1990; settlement
reached in May 1994; DOC sent instructions to Customs in September 1994; Customs never liqui-
dated; and LG Electronics filed suit in 1996).
78. It is beyond the scope of this article provide an in-depth analysis of the effects of trade
actions on the U.S. economy.
79. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a)-(b), 1673a(a)-(b) (2000).
80. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(B), (9)(A) (2000).
81. See, e.g., Marie Louise Hurabiell, Comment, Protectionism Versus Free Trade: Imple-
menting the GATTAntidumping Agreement in the United States, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 567, 567
(1995) ("The trade policy of the United States government reflects an attempt to reconcile the inher-
ently incompatible goals of free trade and protectionism.... [T]he United States regularly invokes
antidumping measures. These protectionist policies are incompatible with a system of free trade...
.11).
82. See, e.g., Bruce M. Steen, Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative Approach in
Defining 'Like Product' and 'Domestic Injury' under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 73 VA. L.
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The initiation of an antidumping investigation will affect the market
conditions for both petitioners and respondents. Immediately, both sides
incur litigation costs.8 3 The effects of litigation costs on petitioners and
respondents depend on how well they can absorb the costs associated
with the process. 84  Next, provided that the DOC makes an affirmative
preliminary finding in the investigation phase, foreign imports will be
subject to cash deposits, making imports comparatively more expensive
than the domestic equivalent. The petitioners are likely to enjoy positive
effects of the imposition of cash deposits. For example, imports become
more expensive and the uncertainty of supply from foreign sources may
force purchasers to switch suppliers from foreign to domestic sources.
The longer the cash deposits remain in effect, the longer time period the
petitioners enjoy protection from foreign imports. Thus, it is usually in
the interest of U.S. industry to delay the process for as long as possible.
The effects of antidumping proceedings and the length of the liqui-
dation process on respondents are easy to discern. The long time period
between importation and final determination of duty liability has two
primary negative effects.
First, the payment of cash deposits represents an opportunity cost
and an importer also risks suffering a loss on goods sold if the final duty
liability exceeds the cash deposits paid. The length of the liquidation
process may mean that an importer will not be able to internalize the
future increase in duty liability into the price of its products. Arguably,
the negative effects of the uncertainty can be alleviated by the importer's
awareness of the antidumping proceeding upon importation allowing the
importer to make necessary price adjustments for future duty liability. 5
However, due to the uncertain nature of the final duty liability, the im-
porter would have to "guesstimate" the final duty liability. Not infre-
quently, the final duty liability applied at liquidation is higher than the
cash deposits paid at importation.86 On the other hand, the final duty
liability might be lower than the cash deposits paid. In that case, the
REv. 1459, 1471 (1987) (arguing that "the current approach of United States antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty law and enforcement is biased in favor of affirmative findings of injury.").
83. The parties incur litigations costs only to the extent to which they participate in the pro-
ceedings. Before participating, a rational economic actor will evaluate the costs and benefits from
participating. Respondents often find that it is not economically defensible to participate because the
costs of doing so will be higher than any reduction in dumping duties expected. In particular, small
respondent-companies find it too burdensome to participate and may choose to stop importing into
the United States.
84. To a certain extent, the cost of litigating a case may be spread among the representatives
of one side by choosing joint representation or a division of labor, where applicable. The legal bills
alone for an antidumping investigation may end up anywhere from in the hundred thousands of
dollars to over a million. On top of that, a litigating party may find it wise to pay for legal represen-
tation in administrative reviews and judicial appeals.
85. Cf H.R. REP. No. 95-621, at 25 (1977) [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
86. See, e.g., Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ct. Int'l Trade),
aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Various entries were deemed liquidated as entered at rates
under 60%, instead of at the antidumping duty rate sustained by the courts, which was over 106%.");
Int'I Trading, 281 F.3d at 1270-71 (Imported towels initially subject to a 2.72% duty rate but were
liquidated at a 42.31% duty rate).
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importer would receive a windfall if the importer already took the poten-
tial for a duty increase into account when selling the goods. However, if
the importer was unable to raise prices to recoup the cash deposits paid at
importation, the importer has not gained anything.
87
The second negative effect of the long time period between impor-
tation and final determination of duty liability is that a corporate entity
must carry the uncertain duty liability in its financial statements during
the time from importation until liquidation. This type of uncertain liabil-
ity has accounting and business implications for importers. Under gen-
erally-accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), an uncertain liability
must be mentioned in a footnote to the financial statement.8 8 If the liabil-
ity can be estimated, a loss contingency, the company must accrue this
loss in its financial statement. 89  The uncertain duty liability may also
distort the company's financial statements and mislead investors because
the unknown future duty liability is not taken into consideration in the
cost of goods sold.90 Therefore, the company may look more profitable
than it actually is. However, the uncertain duty liability will have no
effect on the company's cash flow.91 From a business standpoint, the
company may choose to segregate a potential future loss on its balance
sheet.92 Many importers set up an escrow account for the potential future
duty liability. An uncertain liability may affect the creditworthiness of
the company and its ability to plan its business. 93 In addition, the CIT
has found that "[t]he public interest is also prejudiced by the impediment
to the free flow of commerce caused by these inordinate delays. 94
87. The antidumping statutes intend that the cost of the antidumping duty be passed along to
U.S. customers, thereby increasing the price of foreign imports sold in the U.S. market. While
"unaffiliated" importers may choose to absorb the antidumping duties, the antidumping scheme
prevents affiliated importers from doing so. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a) (2000) (export price of unaf-
filiated party); 19 C.F.R. § 351.401 (2005) (dumping calculation generally); 19 C.F.R. § 351.403
(2005) (sales to affiliated parties); 19 C.F.R. § 351.402(f) (2005) (adjustment for duty absorption).
88. ALLAN AFTERMAN, GAAP PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.3.2 (2005) ("The basic types of cur-
rent liabilities [include] ... [a]ccruals."); see also id. § 9.4 ("GAAP requires that the total amount of
current liabilities ... be presented on the face of a classified balance sheet.").
89. Id. § 33.3.1 ("A contingency is... an existing... situation... involving uncertainty as to
a possible gain or loss that will ultimately be resolved when or more future events occur or fail to
occur."); id. § 33.3.2 ("An estimated loss from a contingency should be accrued and charged ... if
both of the following conditions are met: (1) Information ... indicates that . . . a liability incurred as
of the date of the financial statements; and (2) The amount of the loss can be reasonably esti-
mated."); see also id. § 33.4 ("For a loss contingency, the following information should be disclosed:
... If an estimated loss has been accrued ... the nature of the contingency [and] the amount of
accrued loss.").
90. Linda C. Quinn, Federal Disclosure Developments, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 83, 287 (1998) ("Offsetting a contingent liability against expected third-
party recovery may mislead investors as to the probability of recovery and reflect unfounded opti-
mism regarding the creditworthiness of the entity from whom recovery is expected."), available at,
SD11 ALI-ABA 83 (Westlaw).
91. Patric R. Delaney et al.,WILEY GAAP 2001: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 98 (2002) ("The statement of cash flows includes
only inflows and outflows of cash and cash equivalents.").
92. Id. at 41 ("Assets [and] liabilities.., are separated in the balance sheet so that important
relationships can be shown and attention can be focused on significant subtotals.").
93. See id. at 37.
94. Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 358, 364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
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As illustrated, the long time period between importation and liqui-
dation has a multitude of effects on petitioners and respondents. On the
one hand, given that the process is lengthy from the start, further delays
should be avoided. On the other hand, there are circumstances under
which it would be beneficial to either side to delay as long as possible. It
is in the interest of petitioners to achieve as much protection, i.e. with
high margins, for as long as possible. Conversely, the respondents wish
to minimize their margins and keep them in effect for as short a period of
time as possible. Therefore, faced with a threat of having the situation
change for the worse, e.g., if petitioners feared that the DOC would issue
a lower rate than already in effect or the respondents feared a higher rate,
either side has an incentive to delay to keep the favorable status quo for
as long as possible. This conclusion is the simple effect of the time-
value-of-money. The incentive to delay may create inefficiencies, such
as judicial appeals doomed from the start.95 To increase certainty in cus-
toms transactions by speeding up the liquidation process, Congress en-
acted 19 U.S.C. § 1504 in 1978 which provides for deemed liquidation.96
B. The Immediate Effects of Deemed Liquidation
The immediate effects of deemed liquidation on an importer, the
U.S. government and representatives of U.S. industry of deemed liquida-
tion depend on whether the importer overpaid or underpaid estimated
duties at the time of entry.97 The effects on the government and the im-
porter are fairly straight-forward: deemed liquidation will result in a
windfall to one and a loss to the other. If an importer overpaid duties
upon entry, meaning that the cash deposits determined by the DOC in the
investigation were higher than the actual duties found to be owed in the
administrative review, the importer will not be entitled to a refund if
deemed liquidation occurs. Customs and courts take the position that
deemed liquidation bars them from issuing a refund.98 As a result, the
importer lost money and the U.S. government received a windfall. 99
95. The DOC's decisions can be appealed to the CIT and those decisions, in turn, can be
appealed to the Federal Circuit, adding a couple of years during which time the status quo is re-
tained. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000).
96. See Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, §
209(a), 92 Stat. 902 (1978). Courts have found that the purpose of the concept is to provide cer-
tainty in the customs protest for individuals and entities with a potential liability resulting from a
customs transaction. See, e.g., Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 n.5 (citing Dal-Tile Corp. v. United
States, 829 F. Supp. 394, 399 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993)); see also Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1272;
United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
97. Put differently, whether the final duty liability is less (overpayment) or more (underpay-
ment) than the preliminary duties (cash deposits) paid at the time of entry.
98. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that Customs cannot refund over-paid countervailing duties for deemed liquidated entries);
Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 (finding that Customs cannot refund over-paid duties for deemed
liquidated entries); Cust. HQ 228712, supra note 11 (finding that Customs cannot refund over-paid
countervailing duties for deemed liquidated entries).
99. Traditionally, antidumping duties are paid into the U.S. Treasury. Mark L. Movsesian,
Actions against Dumping and Subsidization - Antidumping and SCM Agreements - United States
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 ("Byrd Amendment")-Interest Group Legisla-
tion, 98 AM J. INT'L L. 150, 151 (2004). Currently, by reason of the Continued Dumping and Sub-
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Conversely, if an importer underpays duties upon entry, i.e., the cash
deposits determined by the DOC in the investigation were lower than the
actual duties found to be owed in the administrative review, the importer
will not have to pay the difference if deemed liquidation occurs. This
scenario results in a windfall to the importer, who does not have to pay
the additional duties owed, and in a loss to the government because it
was unable to collect the duties owed.
The effects of deemed liquidation on representatives of U.S. indus-
try are more amorphous. Generally, the antidumping statutes are in-
tended to protect U.S. industry from unfairly traded imports causing in-
jury.100 U.S. industry may gain such protection by initiating an anti-
dumping investigation followed by an affirmative finding by the DOC
sidy Offset Act ("Byrd Amendment"), collected antidumping duties are distributed to the affected
U.S. industry. See 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000). Hence, the U.S. industry also has a significant, direct
financial stake in the liquidation of entries beyond seeing the relief afforded by the administrative
agencies under the U.S. trade laws properly enforced. However, the Appellate Body of the WTO
has found the Byrd Amendment inconsistent with the United States' WTO obligations and the
United States is under an obligation to repeal it. Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/D5234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003)
[hereinafter WTD AB Report Byrd Amend.], 42 I.L.M. 427; David Armstrong, WTO Rebuffs U.S. on
Tariffs: Trade Partners May Impose Tit-for-Tat Levies, It Rules, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at C1
("Early indications were that Washington intends to comply with the WTO decision and that the
Byrd Amendment could be off the books before sanctions are applied."). So far, Congress has not
repealed the Byrd Amendment.
100. James T. Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy through International Legal Minimalism: A
Re-characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 67 (2004)
("Both anti-dumping law and presidential constitutional and legal authority over foreign commerce
were increasingly deployed to protect domestic industries."). While tariffs on imports traditionally
have been used for a host of reasons, such as to generate revenue, the purpose of antidumping law
and similar trade actions is not to generate revenue but to protect the domestic industry from unfairly
traded injurious imports. See, e.g., Altx, Inc. v. United States, 370 F.3d 1108, 1110 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("The antidumping laws protect United States industries against the domestic sale of foreign manu-
factured goods at prices below the fair market value of those goods in the foreign country."); Kemira
Fibres Oy v. United States, 61 F.3d 866, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Indeed... [the] ... primary purpose
of the antidumping law . . . is to protect domestic industry."); Zenith Elec. Corp. v. United States,
755 F. Supp. 397, 403 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) ("The Act is not intended to penalize the foreign indus-
try, but to protect the domestic industry which is likely to be injured or prevented from being estab-
lished by the sale of foreign goods in the United States market .... ); Badger-Powhatan v. United
States, 608 F. Supp. 653, 656 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (finding that antidumping law "was designed to
protect domestic industry from sales of imported merchandise at less than fair value which either
caused or threatened to cause injury"); S. REP. No. 96-249, at 37 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 381, 423, (stating that purpose of statute was to bolster and protect domestic industry);
Robert W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 491 (1993)
("Antidumping laws were designed to protect domestic industry from foreign competition."); James
R. Cannon, Jr., Should the Federal Circuit Take a "Hard Look" at International Trade Cases in the
1990s?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (1991) ("[T]he purpose of the law is to protect domestic
industry from unfair trade .... ); Judith A. Smith, Note, American Lamb Co. v. United States: More
Protection or Less for the Domestic Industry, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 983, 986 (1987) ("Congress devel-
oped the antidumping laws to protect domestic industries from potentially injurious unfair pricing
practices by foreign competitors."). Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to
Implement World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM.
U. INT'L L. REv. 399, 494 (2002) ("Some WTO policies, such as the rules contained in the Anti-
dumping Agreement, have resulted in a proliferation of disputes because they offer a potent means
of protecting domestic injury from dumping practices."); Nicole DiSalvo, Note, Let's Dump the 1916
Antidumping Act: Why the 1994 GATT Provides Better Price Protection for U.S. Industries, 37
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 791, 809 (2004) ("[T]he members of the WTO signed the Uruguay Round
Code, and it is the current antidumping agreement used by member countries to protect domestic
industry.").
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and ITC.'0' The imposed antidumping duty is intended to compensate
for the dumping taking place by raising the price of foreign imports to
the level at which those goods are sold in the foreign manufacturer's
home market, thereby leveling the playing field.102  Thus, the protection
afforded U.S. industry is the amount of the dumping duty - nothing more
and nothing less. In the overpayment situation, the cash deposits col-
lected are higher than the dumping found, and U.S. industry is therefore
afforded a higher level of protection than it is entitled to. 10 3 Conversely,
in the underpayment situation, the cash deposits are lower than the final
antidumping duty liability, and U.S. industry is not afforded the level of
protection it is entitled to.
An additional benefit to the U.S. industry from the collection of an-
tidumping duties is the disbursement of those duties to the affected U.S.
industry under the Byrd Amendment.104  As long as the Byrd Amend-
ment remains in effect, U.S. industry will have an added incentive to file
antidumping petitions because it has a direct financial stake in the out-
come of the liquidation process. 10 5 Therefore, it is in the U.S. industry's
interest that entries are liquidated at the highest possible rate, through
regular or deemed liquidation.
101. See 19 USC § 1673, 1673a(2)(B) (2000).
102. See 19 U.S.C § 1673 (2000) ("there shall be imposed ... an antidumping duty... in an
amount equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price ... for the mer-
chandise"); Globe Metallurgical, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1157 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002);
GTS Indus. S.A. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002); Elkem Metal
Co. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1335 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); Alan F. Holmer et al.,
Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Antidumping Law: In Implementation or Contravention of
the Antidumping Agreement?, 29 INT'L LAW 483, 507 (1995) ("The antidumping law is not intended
as a revenue raiser for the government but as a remedial provision to 'level the playing field."').
There are several business rationales for dumping goods in a particular market. One strategy is to
gain market share from competitors. Adam C. Hawkins, Comment, Antidumping Beyond the GATT
1994: Supporting International Enactment of Legislation Providing Supplemental Remedies, 10 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 149, 152 (1999) ("By reducing prices below cost of production and a rea-
sonable profit (an inefficient act), producers seek to drive out the competition, gain market share,
and ultimately reap monopoly profits."). The manufacturer dumping the goods may decide to take a
lower profit for a finite period of time hoping to out-compete competitors in order to be able to reap
monopoly returns at a later stage. Id. Similarly, a manufacturer may settle for a lesser profit per unit
by dumping hoping to recoup it on a higher volume of sales.
103. Arguably, this scenario is not an example of over-deterrence of the foreign manufac-
turer/importer because it has already imported the merchandise and paid the higher, estimated duties.
104. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000). However, as mentioned supra note 99, the U.S. govern-
ment is under an obligation to repeal the Byrd Amendment as a result of the WTO appellate body
finding that it is inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations. See WTD AB Report Byrd Amend., supra
note 99; David Armstrong, WTO Rebuffs U.S. on Tariffs:Trade Partners May Impose Tit-for-Tat
Levies, It Rules, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at Cl ("Early indications were that Washington intends
to comply with the WTO decision and that the Byrd Amendment could be off the books before
sanctions are applied.").
105. See Eakin Letter, supra note 7. (noting that the Byrd Amendment "encourages more firms
to file or support antidumping cases... [because the] linkage of payments to support for a case is a
direct incentive."). However, a recent Government Accountability Office ("GAO") study did not
find any clear evidence that the Byrd Amendment had caused an increase in the number of trade
cases filed or in the scope or duration of antidumping orders. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND
SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 37-40 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05979.pdf.
2005] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTER VAILING DUTIES 491
C. The Sources of the Problems Associated with Deemed Liquidation
The problems associated with deemed liquidation stem from the
failure of administrative agencies to act in a timely manner, the lack of
consequences in the scheme for failure to act, and the lack of an adminis-
trative remedy for interested parties to undo deemed liquidation.
Deemed liquidation occurs six months after Customs receives no-
tice that the suspension of liquidation has been removed. 0 6 Interpreting
courts have concluded that the six-month time period starts to run when
the DOC publishes the final results of an administrative or judicial re-
view in the Federal Register, 10 7 when the DOC issues public and unam-
biguous liquidation instructions to Customs, 10 8 and, potentially also if
Customs is a party to the proceedings resulting in the removal of the sus-
pension of liquidation. 0 9 However, Customs takes the position that it
106. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
107. Int l Trading, 412 F.3d. at 1313 (results after administrative review, post-URAA statute);
Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381 (results after judicial review); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1274-77 (results
after administrative review, pre-URAA statute). For information on URAA, see supra note 72.
108. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 ("Our case law further requires that, in addition to being unam-
biguous, the notice to Customs be public."); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-82 ("It is just as important
that there be 'an unambiguous and public starting point for the six-month liquidation period' under
these circumstances as it is when liquidation of entries is suspended pending an administrative
review and thereafter the suspension is removed when the final results of the review are an-
nounced."); In Int'l Trading, the court states:
[T]he date of publication provides an unambiguous and public starting point for the six-
month liquidation period, and it does not give the government the ability to postpone in-
definitely the removal of suspension of liquidation (and thus the date by which liquida-
tion must be completed) as would be the case if the six-month liquidation period did not
begin to run until Commerce sent a message to Customs advising of the removal of sus-
pension of liquidation.
281 F.3d at 1275. It is unclear whether non-public liquidation instructions may provide the
requisite notice to Customs. See Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1320-21 (holding that electronic mail
liquidation instructions from Commerce to Customs were neither unambiguous nor public, but
not deciding whether non-public instructions provided the requisite notice to Customs). Argua-
bly, non-public instructions would provide actual notice to Customs. However, non-public
instructions would not provide notice to parties involved in Customs transactions who are not
privy to such instructions. As a result, such parties would be unable to safeguard their interests
by monitoring the liquidation process. From a policy standpoint, it would appear that the better
approach is not to allow non-public instructions to trigger the six-month time period for
deemed liquidation.
109. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1379. In Fujitsu, the court stated:
[S]ection 1504(d) requires that Customs receive notice that a suspension of liquidation
has been removed from "the Department of Commerce, other agency, or a court with ju-
risdiction over the entry." There is no evidence in the record that Customs received such
notice prior to September 16, 1997. It is true, as Fujitsu points out, that on or about July
3, 1996, the Clerk of the Federal Circuit served counsel for the government, the Depart-
ment of Justice, with the decision in Fujitsu General. That fact does not help Fujitsu,
however. The Justice Department represented Commerce, not Customs, before this
court. Service of the Fujitsu General decision upon it did not constitute notice to Cus-
toms.
Id. Similarly, in NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit applied the
Fujitsu rule described above. 411 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005). NEC argued that service of a court's
opinion on the Justice Department's attorneys provided notice to Customs that the suspension of
liquidation had been lifted. NEC Solutions, 411 F.3d at 1346. NEC distinguished Fujitsu by point-
ing out that in that case, the notice was of a Federal Court decision determining a dumping margin
while in NEC's case the notice was of a CIT decision ordering the lifting of suspension of liquida-
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does not have to monitor the Federal Register and that it will only liqui-
date entries after receiving liquidation instructions from the DOC.l °
Thus, the DOC issues two types of notices to effect liquidation: first, it
is required by statute to publish the final results of administrative and
judicial reviews in the Federal Register,"' and second, it issues liquida-
tion instructions to Customs. "
2
In practice, both agencies frequently fail to act in a timely manner.
For example, the DOC may fail to publish the final results in the Federal
Register or fail to issue liquidation instructions to Customs. In such
situations, the time period for deemed liquidation may never start to
run."13 Because Customs takes the position that it will not liquidate en-
tries until it receives instructions from the DOC, if ever, when Customs
finally receives the instructions, the deemed liquidation period may al-
ready have passed.' 14
Peer Chain Co. v. United States"5 is an example of how the DOC's
delay in providing Customs with notice of the final duty liability may
significantly injure an importer. In that case, the Peer Chain Company
had imported roller chain from Japan subject to a preliminary antidump-
ing duty rate of zero percent in 1985.1i6 In 1992, the DOC determined
that the final duty rate was 43.29 percent."17 However, the DOC neither
published notice of the final duty liability nor provided Customs with
tion. Id. The Federal Circuit rejected NEC's argument and agreed with the lower court that "'ser-
vice of an opinion on Justice was not service on Customs."' Id. (quoting Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1379).
110. Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1274 n.2 ("Customs has stated its view that the six-month
period of section 1504(d) is not triggered until Customs receives liquidation instructions from Com-
merce."). Customs' role in the liquidation procedure is purely "ministerial" in that Customs only is
charged with executing the mandate given by the DOC. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1324 ("Cus-
toms' role in making antidumping decisions ... is generally ministerial."); Allegheny Bradford
Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169, (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (citing Yacheng Baolong
Biochemical Products Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)) ("In
implementing the instructions of Commerce to liquidate entries subject to an antidumping or coun-
tervailing duty order, Customs' actions are ministerial in nature."); Fujitsu Ten Corp. of Am. v.
United States, 957 F. Supp. 245, 248-49 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that Fujitsu had no basis upon
which to file suit against Customs, since Commerce made all the decisions): Am. Hi-Fi Int'l, Inc. v.
United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1340, 1342 (1995) ("Customs does not make any 'decisions,' but
performs merely a ministerial role in the collection of interest pursuant to the antidumping duty
laws."); see Cust. HQ 230339, supra note 71. ("[Customs] role in the antidumping process is simply
to follow Commerce's instructions .... ).
111. 19 U.S.C. §§ 151 6 a(c), (e), 1675(a)(1) (2000).
112. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(c)(1), (2), 1673d(d) (2000).
113. See, e.g., Peer Chain Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1368 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2004) (finding that the six-month time period will not begin to run if the DOC does not send liquida-
tion instructions to Customs, despite the DOC's five-year delay).
114. See, e.g., Int'l Trading, 421 F.3d at 1303 (suspension lifted Oct. 30, 1996, deemed liqui-
dation occurred six months thereafter, DOC sent liquidation instructions on July 1, 1997); Fujitsu,
283 F.3d at 1364 (suspension lifted on Oct. 1, 1996, deemed liquidation occurred six months thereaf-
ter, DOC sent liquidation instructions on Sept. 26, 1997); Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1268 (suspen-
sion lifted Feb. 12, 1996, deemed liquidation occurred six months thereafter, DOC sent liquidation
instructions on Aug. 29, 1996).
115. 316 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
116. Peer Chain, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
117. Id. In essence, the DOC determined that the entries imported at the zero percent duty rate
at the time of importation were dumped and should have been subject to a 43.29 percent duty rate.
Id. at 1358-59.
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actual notice of the final duty liability. 18 Hence, the six-month time
period for deemed liquidation never started to run. Finally, in 2000, the
DOC provided Customs with actual notice of the final duty liability."
19
Customs liquidated the Peer Chain Company's entries within six months
of receiving actual notice from the DOC."2 ° The CIT found that Peer
Chain Company's entries had been properly liquidated and that it could
not provide any equitable relief, despite "the government's egregious
delay."'12' Deemed liquidation did not occur because the six-month time
period never started to run because of the DOC's failure to provide no-
tice to Customs. 122 Consequently, the Peer Chain Company was forced
to pay $167,111 in back-duties, together with interest which had com-
pounded daily from 1986 to 2000.123
Customs also often fails to act in a timely manner, causing deemed
liquidation to occur. In International Trading Co. v. United States, 24 the
importer had imported shop towels from Bangladesh between 1993 and
1994 and paid antidumping duty cash deposit of 2.72 percent. 25 On Feb-
ruary 12, 1996, the DOC published in the Federal Register the final re-
sults of the administrative review covering the subject entries. 126 The
final AD duty rate was 42.31 percent. 12 7 The DOC sent an e-mail mes-
sage to Customs the next day noting that the administrative review had
been completed but advising Customs not to liquidate until receiving
liquidation instructions. 128 In August 1996, the DOC sent a non-public e-
mail message to Customs notifying it that the suspension of liquidation
had been lifted and instructing it to liquidate covered entries at the AD
duty rate of 42.31 percent. 29 Customs liquidated the entries in October
1996, nine months after publication of the final results in the Federal
Register but only approximately two months after receiving liquidation
instructions from Customs, and issued a bill for additional antidumping
duties. 30 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Cir-
cuit") held that the entries in question liquidated by operation of law six
months after publication of the final results after administrative review,
February 12, 1996, at the rate asserted upon entry. 13  In International
118. Id. at 1359-60.
119. Id. at 1360.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1362, 1368.
122. Id. at 1363.
123. Id. at 1360.
124. 281 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The case dealt with the pre-URAA version of 19 U.S.C.
Section 1504(d). In a subsequent case involving the same parties, the Federal Circuit reached the
same general result when interpreting the post-URAA version of Section 1504(d). See Int'l Trading
Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).





130. Id. at 1270-71.
131. Id. at 1277.
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Trading, deemed liquidation worked to the advantage of the importer and
to the detriment of representatives of U.S. industry and the U.S. govern-
ment.
Cemex, S.A. v. United States'32 is an example of how the DOC and
Customs' mistakes in the liquidation process may injure the U.S. gov-
ernment and U.S. industry. A U.S. importer had imported cement from
Mexico, subject to a preliminary antidumping duty rate of 56.94 percent
ad valorem. 133 The DOC determined the final duty rate to be 106.846
percent. 134 The DOC failed to publish official notice of the final results
in the Federal Register but did send non-public liquidation instructions to
Customs in March 1998.131 In April 2001, approximately three years
later, Customs, erroneously believing that the entries in question had
been deemed liquidated six months after March 1998, liquidated the en-
tries at the preliminary duty rate of 59.94 percent rather than the final
rate of 106.846 percent. 136 The Federal Circuit concluded that the March
1998 notice was ineffective and that the six-month time period for
deemed liquidation never started to run.137 Nevertheless, Customs erro-
neous liquidation in April 2001 at the lower, preliminary duty rate had
become final on the parties and was therefore valid.
Part of the problem caused by the DOC's delay in notifying Cus-
toms about the removal of the suspension of liquidation is the lack of
statutory deadlines for doing so and the lack of consequences for failure
to do so. In addition, the DOC is not under a statutory obligation to send
liquidation instructions to Customs. 38 While the statutes obligates the
DOC to publish in the Federal Register final results after an administra-
tive review, they do not contain any deadline within which to do So.
13 9
Finally, the statutes require that the DOC publish the final results after
judicial review within ten days of the court's decision. 140 However, in-
terpreting courts have concluded that the ten-day requirement is directory
rather than mandatory and that no consequences attach for the DOC's
failure to act.141 In contrast, Section 1504(d) contains both a statutorily
132. 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
133. Id. at 1316.
134. Id. at 1315.
135. Id at 1316, 1318 n.3.
136. Id. at 1317.
137. Id. at 1321.
138. While not mandated explicitly by statute or regulations, it appears reasonable to conclude
that issuing liquidation instructions is a necessary part of fulfilling the statutory scheme. The DOC
appears to agree. In its Antidumping Manual, the DOC sets forth its internal procedure for issuing
liquidation instructions to Customs. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, ch. 18
at 10-17 (Mar. 25, 1998) [hereinafter ANTIDUMPING MANUAL] (liquidation instructions are also
known as appraisement instructions), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual. Among other
things, the DOC states that failure to issue liquidation instructions means that "the DOC has not fully
applied the AD law." Id. at 11.
139. 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(1) (2000).
140. 19 U.S.C. §1516a(c), (e) (2000).
141. See, e.g., Cemex 384 F.3d at 1321 n.6 ("[S]ection 1516a(e) sets forth no consequences for
failure to comply with its publication requirement."); Fujitsu, F.3d at 1382 ("[T]here is no language
in section 1516a(e) that attaches a consequence to a failure by Commerce to meet the ten-day publi-
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mandated deadline, six months, and a consequence for Customs' failure
to meet it - deemed liquidation. Therefore, thr appropriate way to pre-
vent negative effects of deemed liquidation will depend on whether the
remedy is sought against the DOC or Customs.
Finally, it appears that interested parties have no available adminis-
trative remedy to prevent negative effects of deemed liquidation.
142
While there is a procedure for protesting Customs' decisions available to
importers, in the majority of cases, courts and Customs have found that
deemed liquidation is not a Customs decision and, therefore, cannot be
protested. 43 Besides, before deemed liquidation has occurred, there has
not been any Customs decision or action to protest; conversely, after
deemed liquidation has occurred, it cannot be undone. 44 In addition, this
protest procedure is not available to U.S. industry, which has a vested
interest in monitoring the implementation of the protection afforded by
cation requirement, let alone the consequence of deemed liquidation under section 1504(d)."); Cana-
dian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he lack of conse-
quential language in the latter part of section (d) if the Customs Service does not meet that time
frame leads us to conclude that Congress intended this part of section (d) to be only directory."). But
see Timken Co. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 373, 377 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) ("Section 1516a(e)
thus mandated Commerce to publish notice of [a] decision ... ").
142. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. In a recent case, the CIT indicated that there
might be an available administrative remedy to deal with deemed liquidation once it has occurred in
certain, limited circumstances. Norsk Hydro Canada Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2004). In Norsk Hydra, the CIT re-affirmed that Customs notices of reliquidation are
protestable. Id. at 1178. More importantly, the CIT raised the possibility that a Customs notice that
a particular entry has been deemed liquidation may be challenged under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c). Id at
1178-79. Under § 1520, an importer may request reliquidation to correct mistakes of fact, clerical
errors, or other inadvertences in Customs liquidation decisions within one year of liquidation. 19
U.S.C. §1520(c)(1) (2000) (repealed 2004). The CIT stated that "Customs' failure to liquidate
entries in accordance with Commerce's instructions cannot be categorized as a mistake of fact or a
clerical error [but that] liquidation by operation of law may result from inadvertence." Norsk Hydro,
350 F. Supp. at 1179. According to the CIT, an importer may challenge such inadvertence under §
1520(c)(1). It is unclear what type of "inadvertences" would be challengeable under § 1520, espe-
cially in light of the consistent statements by courts and Customs that deemed liquidation cannot be
protested or undone once it has occurred. See, e.g., infra note 143.
143. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1558-59 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fujitsu Gen.
Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000), affd, 283 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2002); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 (review of protest application); see Cust. HQ
228712, supra note II (decision to a request for internal advice). See also Allegheny Bradford
Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) ("The application of the
voidance doctrine is supported by the inadequacy of administrative remedies and the inappropriate-
ness of Customs as a forum for any such remedies. Here, as in other cases where liquidations vio-
lated an order of this Court, there is no meaningful protest to be had at the administrative level nor is
a determination of Customs really at issue."); Eurodif S.A. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1288,
1289-90 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321-23 (Ct.
Int'l. Trade 2003) (holding that the plaintiff did not have "standing to challenge the illegality of these
liquidations ... because it is not an importer, and ... 19 U.S.C. § 1516a and not § 1514 was the
[sole] mechanism governing challenges to antidumping duty determinations"); Yacheng Baolong
Biochemical Products Co., Ltd. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1358 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003).
Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. In two recent cases, the CIT has indicated in
dicta that deemed liquidation possibly could be protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk
Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1178 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); Cemex, 279
F. Supp. 2d at 1362, aff'd, 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
144. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding that deemed liquidation cannot be protested before it has occurred and cannot be undone
thereafter); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11; see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note II (finding that
Customs decisions are protestable but that deemed liquidation occurs by operation of law and does
not involve a Customs decision).
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the U.S. trade laws. 45 Furthermore, there is no administrative remedy
available to force the DOC to provide notice of the removal of the sus-
pension of liquidation. As illustrated, the current liquidation scheme is
plagued by statutory gaps and administrative failure which may injure
importers, the U.S. Government or representatives of U.S. industry.
D. Pertinent Public Policy Considerations
The problems associated with the liquidation process are caused by
the DOC and Customs' delays in executing their statutory duties. But,
the DOC's obligation to act is hard to enforce because the statutes do not
contain deadlines or consequences for the DOC's failure to act. How-
ever, Customs is under a clear obligation to liquidate within six months
of receiving notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation.
1 46
The proper administration of U.S. trade laws is "clearly in the public
interest."''47 Any solution to the problems associated with the liquidation
process must take into consideration public policy concerns.
First, it is necessary to examine the interests of the parties involved
in the process. Foreign manufacturers and importers have an interest in
market access and the ability to sell imported goods in the United States.
This interest has a discernable effect on the U.S. economy. For example,
foreign manufacturers and importers may have operations in the United
States providing jobs, goods and services to the U.S. market. In addition,
competition from foreign goods has beneficial effects on consumer
choice and prices in the U.S. market. Of course, competition from for-
eign imports may have negative effects on the U.S. market as well. Rep-
resentatives of U.S. industry, in turn, also provide jobs, goods and ser-
vices to the U.S. market. Many U.S. companies are dependent on for-
eign imports for manufacturing inputs. The imposition of duties on for-
eign imports will decrease the competitive pressure on U.S. industry
from foreign sources. On the other hand, additional duties imposed on
important production inputs will negatively affect U.S. industry. In addi-
tion, U.S. industry has a direct stake in the collection of antidumping
duties as long as the Byrd Amendment remains in effect. The Byrd
Amendment provides that the collected duties be distributed to the af-
fected industry. 48 The U.S. government has an interest in maintaining a
healthy economy which can provide job opportunities for the population.
To the extent that collected duties are not distributed to the affected in-
dustry, the government also has a direct stake in the collection of duties
because it goes into the federal Treasury. This stream of revenue could
145. 19 U.S.C. §1514(c)(2) (1994). See also Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1323 n.9; Cemex, 279 F.
Supp. 2d at 1362.
146. See 19 U.S.C. §1504(d) (2000).
147. U.S. Ass'n of Imps. of Textiles & Apparel v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1351
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (finding that proper administration of trade laws is in the public interest for
purposes of meeting the fourth requirement of the test for issuing a preliminary injunction).
148. 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000).
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be used for governmental purposes. 149 The U.S. government also has an
interest in the proper administration of U.S. laws and policies. Finally,
U.S. multilateral trading partners also have a stake in the outcome of the
U.S. liquidation process. WTO members negotiate international trade
concessions and rules in complicated multilateral negotiations under the
auspice of the WTO. These negotiations take years to complete. The
resulting international trade law represents painstakingly negotiated
compromises. In addition, the development of international trade law is
intimately connected to the negotiation of trade concessions as WTO
members grant trade concessions in exchange for support of trade rule.
Antidumping laws are examples of such negotiated international trade
rules. The United States incorporated the outcome of the latest WTO
negotiation round, the Uruguay Round, into U.S. law. The DOC and
Customs are responsible for executing U.S. international trade obliga-
tions. These agencies' failure to follow the WTO-implementing U.S.
laws negates the beneficial results trade negotiations are intended to pro-
duce and causes friction with U.S. multilateral trading partners.
150
Second, the incentives created by the current scheme, and any fu-
ture scheme, must comport with public policy. Courts have concluded
that the effects of deemed liquidation are binding on all parties with an
interest in the liquidation process.15 1 Importers stand to lose money in
the overpayment situation if deemed liquidation occurs. The U.S. gov-
ernment and representatives of U.S. industry stand to lose money and
protection against unfair imports in the underpayment situation. The
three parties stand to gain or save money in the converse situations.
From an equity standpoint, it would appear wise public policy to impose
negative consequences only on the party who is in control of those con-
sequences occurring: in this case, the U.S. government. Indeed, the
economic principle of the least-cost avoider is well-recognized in law
and economics, tort law and contract law.' 52 The U.S. government itself
149. For example, Customs has recently been given new, additional responsibilities in protect-
ing the United States against terrorism. These new responsibilities add new stress to already scarce
and stretched administrative resources. The money lost through deemed liquidation could have been
used to fund such activities.
150. Colloquially, compare U.S. international trade obligations to a football game. The WTO
negotiations represent a close-to-100-yard drive starting at one end zone and ending close to the
other. The benefits of the negotiations represent the goal line of the opposing team. When the DOC
and Customs fail to fulfill their statutory obligations, mandated by U.S. international trade obliga-
tions, it is as if the football team fumbles the ball on the one-yard line of the opposing team after a
99-yard drive.
151. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(finding that an importer was not entitled to a refund of duties paid for entries which were deemed
liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note II (holding that Customs is unable to reliquidate
entries already deemed liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note 11 (denying a refund because
entries were deemed liquidated).
152. See, e.g., Conoco Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 289 F.3d 819, 827 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
district court's equitable calculus relies in part on the concept that placing liability with the least-cost
avoider increases the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures and ensures that such
measures would have the greatest marginal effect on preventing the loss.") (internal quotations
omitted); Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 1999) ("The liability
resulting from placing such a duty on the party who is not the least-cost avoider would expose that
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in Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States,153 argued against
deemed liquidation applying to an importer because importers who had
overpaid duties then would be unjustly affected. 54 The Federal Circuit
recognized the validity of the argument but, in the end, found that
deemed liquidation had not occurred. 55 The current interpretation of the
statutes gives the U.S. government little incentive to prevent deemed
liquidation from occurring in the overpayment situation.
In addition, the government has the power to prevent deemed liqui-
dation from occurring in the underpayment situation by preventing the
six-month time period from starting. The Federal Circuit has noted that
19 U.S.C. Section 1504 was enacted to remove from the government the
power to delay liquidation indefinitely, which was the case prior to
1978.156 The interests of U.S. industry and the government are aligned in
this respect. Hence, whether deemed liquidation occurs and the effect it
has is wholly within the control of the government. The money collected
will directly benefit the U.S. government. Granted, the benefit currently
is passed through to U.S. industry in the form of Byrd Amendment dis-
tributions. 157 However, the WTO appellate body has found that the Byrd
Amendment is inconsistent with U.S. WTO obligations and that the
United States must repeal it.'
58
In the overpayment situation, if deemed liquidation occurs, U.S. in-
dustry also benefits indirectly by gaining more protection against foreign
imports than allowed under the statute (and WTO rules). The fact that
the government stands to lose money in the underpayment situation is of
no consequence as it is the desired result under equitable principles be-
party to an almost incomprehensible number of claims in which a variety of plaintiffs - related and
unrelated to defendants - allege the duty was breached because this particular plaintiff was supposed
to be designated the beneficiary or, conversely, the owner of the account really meant for no one to
be designated."); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 5 F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("Placing liability with the least-cost avoider increases the incentive for
that party to adopt preventive measures and ensures that such measures would have the greatest
marginal effect on preventing the loss."); Roger G. Noll, Reforming Risk Regulation, 545 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 165, 167 (1996) ("In addition, regulation shifts some of the costs of
identifying and ameliorating the risk to those who are most informed about it... [thus,] regulation
has a potential efficiency benefit according to the 'least-cost avoider' principle ...."); David W.
Bames & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to Take Corrective Precau-
tions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 367 (1994) ("Whenever the unilateral precautions of one of the actors
involved in an accident scenario would be sufficient to avoid the risk of harm, an efficient incentive
is one that motivates the least cost avoider of the risk to take his available cost-justified precau-
tions."). For more information on the concept of least cost avoider, see generally GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-40 (1970) (discussing the concept of "least cost
avoider," a theory Calabresi authored).
153. 613 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
154. Canadian Fur Trappers, 613 F. Supp. at 365-66.
155. Id. at 617-18.
156. Int'l Trading Co., 281 F.3d at 1272 (citing Int'l Cargo & Surety Ins. Co. v. United States,
779 F. Supp. 174, 177 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991)) ("'Customs could delay liquidation as long as it
pleased, with or without giving notice.").
157. See 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2000).
158. WTD AB Report Byrd Amend., supra note 99, 318; David Armstrong, WTO Rebuffs U.S.
on Tariffs; Trade Partners May Impose Tit-for-Tat Levies, It Rules, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2004, at
CI ("Early indications were that Washington intends to comply with the WTO decision and that the
Byrd Amendment could be off the books before sanctions are applied.").
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cause the government controls the prevention of such loss. Of course,
one could argue that U.S. industry will suffer a loss of protection against
unfairly traded imports in the underpayment situation. However, any
potential loss of protection is of little concern from a policy standpoint.
In antidumping proceedings, U.S. industry affirmatively avails itself of
the protection afforded by the U.S. government. Because errors are
within the exclusive control of the government, U.S. industry has to ac-
cept them as part of doing business with the government. Importers, on
the other hand, are involuntarily involved in the process and should not
be forced to bear negative consequences resulting therefrom.
Third, public policy dictates that the scheme must operate in a cost-
effective manner. The DOC and Customs usually point to a large work-
load, lack of personnel and human error for failure to take prompt ac-
tion. 159 Potential costs associated with removing these delays could in-
clude the hiring of more personnel, the creation of new administrative
agencies to alleviate the work load of current agencies or the develop-
ment of a procedure to eliminate human error.160 Most likely, a remedy
to prevent agency delay would involve the federal government providing
additional funding to the agency. From that standpoint, other non-
monetary remedies, such as statutory deadlines with consequences en-
forceable in a federal court or before an administrative agency, might be
more cost-efficient.
Fourth, it is important to make sure that any remedy for the prob-
lems with the liquidation process does not give rise to new inefficiencies.
For example, the tightening of administrative deadlines could lead to
more erroneous agency decisions. In addition, the creation of a new ad-
ministrative remedy may add to the already large administrative burden
of the involved agencies, thereby giving rise to more errors and delays.
Finally, judicial economy dictates that problems in the process are
remedied at the agency level as opposed to in federal courts. Without
any change in the statutory scheme, as evidenced by the apparent recent
increase in litigation, courts will become increasingly involved in the
enforcement of statutory mandates. Courts have expressed frustration
with agency delays in the process and indicated that changes in the proc-
159. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1316-17 (confusing communications between Customs and the DOC);
NEC Solutions (Am.), Inc. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 n. 15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)
("According to the Government, [its] administrative oversight occurred, in part, because of Com-
merce's 'time consuming' publication process," but "Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy... is no
excuse for delay."); LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v United States, 991 F. Supp. 668, 676-77 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1997) (erroneous electronic and automatic liquidation).
160. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Customs has in place an automated system for
the liquidation of goods. See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Yes You Can (n.d.), available at
http://customs.gov/ (follow "publications" hyperlink; then follow "Trade Automated Systems"
hyperlink; then follow "Yes You Can on ACS" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 12, 2005). Customs'
Automated Commercial System ("ACS") enables Customs "to track, control, and process all com-
mercial goods imported into the United States ... (and] facilitates merchandise processing, signifi-
cantly cuts costs, and reduces paperwork requirements for both Customs and the importing commu-
nity." Id. Despite the use of this system, errors occur.
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ess are necessary.' 61 In particular, courts appear concerned with the fact
that the agencies are not following clear statutory mandates and that par-
ties instead must rely on the judiciary branch for enforcement.16  In this
respect, it is important to point out that judicial review also may serve as
a source of delay in the liquidation process. Under the principle of time-
value of money, it may be beneficial to a party to delay the liquidation
process as long as possible if the expected end-results will be unfavor-
able to the party. For example, if an importer has paid low cash deposits
but faces the possibility of high liquidation rates, it may be in the best
interest of the importer to delay liquidation as long as possible by, e.g.,
filing a judicial appeal. The converse situation applies to U.S. industry.
III. DEEMED LIQUIDATION AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Deemed liquidation may result in a windfall to either the importer
or the U.S. government depending on whether the importer overpaid or
underpaid duties at the time of entry. 163 The plain language of the statute
does not make a distinction between whether deemed liquidation is bene-
ficial to importers or the government. 164 However, this interpretation
appears somewhat at odds with the legislative history of 19 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1504(d). In enacting the provision, Congress appears to have in-
tended that deemed liquidation would protect importers from unknown
future liabilities.
165
Congress has long recognized that undue delay in liquidation re-
sulted in losses to importers and surety companies.166  Before enacting
Section 1504(d) in 1978, there was no statutory requirement that liquida-
161. See, e.g., NEC, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 n.15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003). In NEC, the court
stated:
Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy... is no excuse for delay. Commerce is aware of
its statutory obligations and should have crafted its procedures accordingly. The Gov-
ernment brazenly claims that an interested party who believes it will be injured by a delay
"is not without remedy" because it can seek relief by petitioning for a writ of mandamus.
... The idea that a party must seek such an extraordinary remedy to ensure that Com-
merce simply fulfills its statutory responsibilities is untenable. By delaying liquidation in
this manner, Commerce undermines both the antidumping duty laws and Congress' intent
to settle importers' liabilities promptly.
Id. See also Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 358, 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (quot-
ing the transcript from a telephone conference between the parties and the trial court) ("Suffice it to
say, [the Court] will not permit the Court to be the administrative agency nor is the Court interested
in being involved in impeding the administrative process.").
162. See, e.g., NEC, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 n.15.
163. See supra Part lI.B.
164. 19 U.S.C. §1504(d) (2000) ("Customs ... shall liquidate the entry... within 6 months
after receiving notice of the removal [of the suspension]... Any entry... not liquidated.., within
6 months after receiving such notice shall be treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty,
value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record."). See
Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 ("[T]he relief and certitude of deemed liquidation [does not] turn on
who, the government or the industry, lays claim to the event. When the clock is ticking, it is ticking
for both parties.")
165. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32.
166. Surety companies are in essence "insurance companies" vouching for the duty liability of
a principal, e.g., an importer. See http://www.surety.org/content.cfm?lid=70&catid=2 (last visited
Nov. 12, 2005).
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tion be completed within a specified time limit. 67  The enactment of
Section 1504(d) appears to have been prompted by a fear that delay in
liquidation would negatively affect U.S. relations with foreign nations as
well as the financial situation of importers and surety companies. During
the 1975 hearings regarding Customs Administration and Valuation (in
the context of the Antidumping Act of 1921 168), a congressional witness
from the U.S. Treasury Department pointed out that the intentional with-
holding of liquidation created "an unjustified impediment to trade" be-
cause it "would risk a major confrontation with [U.S.] trading part-
ners."' 169  The U.S. Treasury further stated that "a purposeful delay in
liquidation would unfairly subject the U.S. taxpayers and the importer, to
tax liabilities which could not be reasonably anticipated.' 70  Even
though the U.S. Treasury did not so state, it is obvious that undue delay
of liquidation has the same potential negative effect regardless of
whether it is inadvertently or purposefully delayed.
When enacting Section 1504 in 1978, both the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate emphasized that the provision was intended to
protect importers and surety companies from unknown future liabilities.
The House Committee on Ways and Means reported that adoption of the
deemed liquidation provision would lead to "considerable benefit to...
importers."'' 7  The deemed liquidation concept would eliminate future
Customs' requests for additional duties from an importer which had al-
ready sold the goods at a price that did not take into consideration the
future increase in duty liability. 72 Similarly, the Senate Committee on
Finance stated that the adoption of Section 1504 would "increase cer-
tainty in the customs process for importers, surety companies, and other
third parties with a potential liability relating to a customs transac-
tion."' 73  According to the Committee, the problem with the pre-1978
167. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31; see H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 24. See also Customs
Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, § 209(a), 92 Stat. 888, 905
(1978). Compare 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (1976), with 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 111978).
168. Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, §§ 201-12, 42 Stat. 11-15 (1921), amended by Trade Agree-
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978-2076 (1975). The Anti-Dumping Act of 1921
was subsequently repealed except as to findings or court orders in effect on the date of repeal. Trade
Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (1979).
169. Customs Administration and Valuation of Imports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 9 (1975) (statement of David R. Mac-
donald, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs; answers
to questions submitted by the Hon. William J. Green, Chairman of the subcommittee).
170. Customs Administration and Valuation of Imports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 25 (1975) (answers by the Treasury De-
partment to questions submitted by the Hon. William J. Green, Chairman of the subcommittee).
171. See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 4. The Committee also noted that Customs would benefit
from the enactment of the provision through "improved management of the liquidation process
which would result in some costs savings." Id.
172. Id. In addition, the deemed liquidation provision would allow surety companies to better
control their liabilities and alleviate the risk of loss caused by the dissolution (default) of the surety
companies' principals caused by undue delay in liquidating entries. Id.
173. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32 (cited in Cemex S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d
1357, 1360 n.5 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003) (citing Dal-Tile Corp. v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 394, 399
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted))); see also Int'l Trading Co., 281
F.3d at 1272; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559.
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scheme (without deemed liquidation) was that "an importer may learn
years after goods have been imported and sold that additional duties are
due, or may have deposited more money for estimated duties than are
actually due but be unable to recover the excess for years as he awaits
liquidation." 174  The legislative history lends strong support for the ar-
gument that Congress intended Section 1504 to protect mainly importers.
Customs and interpreting courts have agreed that the main purpose
of Section 1504 is to protect importers and surety companies from un-
known liabilities by providing finality in the liquidation procedure. For
example, in United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc.,175 the Federal
Circuit noted that "the 'deemed liquidation' provision of section 1504
was added to the customs laws in 1978 to place a limit on the period
within which importers and sureties would be subject to the prospect of
liability for a customs entry." 176 As was pointed out earlier, in Canadian
Fur Trappers v. United States,177 the U.S. Government actually argued,
and the CIT recognized, that importers would be injured in the overpay-
ment situation if deemed liquidation occurred barring them from receiv-
ing a refund. 17  However, the CIT concluded that deemed liquidation
had not occurred in that case.
179
The legislative history expresses a clear intent that Section 1504
was enacted to protect importers. "A clear statement in the committee
report responsible for drafting a proposed statute is reliable evidence of
congressional intent where that congressional statement is not contrary to
other sources of legislative history or the clearly expressed language in
the statute."1 80 Congress expressed a concern with delays in the process
and the negative effects those delays had on the financial health of im-
porters and surety companies. Congress also expressed a strong prefer-
ence for the protection of importers, recognizing that they are valuable
174. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32. In addition, the Committee noted that the provision of
deemed liquidation would allow surety companies to better control their liabilities and to protect
them from the risk of default by the principals caused by undue delay in liquidating entries. Id. See
also supra note 166 (regarding definition of "surety"companies).
175. 112 F.3d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
176. Id. at 1559. The Federal Circuit further stated that "[t]he purpose of section 1504 was to
bring finality to the duty assessment process." Id See also Int'l Trading Co., 281 F.3d at 1272
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Dal-Tile Corp., 829 F. Supp. at 399) ("The primary purpose of [section
1504] was to 'increase certainty in the customs process for importer, surety companies, and other
third parties with a potential liability relating to a customs transaction."').
177. 691 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
178. Canadian Fur Trappers, 691 F. Supp. at 369 (the defendant, the U.S. Government, argued
that "if deemed liquidation ... resulted as a consequence of Custom's [sic] failure to liquidate within
90 days of the termination of suspension, then importers who ha[d] deposited estimated duties
greater than the amount that they actually owe[d would] be unjustly affected by this outcome, as
they [could] not be entitled to a refund.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 616 (citation omitted). The U.S. Customs Court has stated that:
It is the function of this court on judicial review to interpret and apply the tariff laws in
light of the intent of Congress. In the performance of this function, the court cannot defer
to an administrative interpretation or application of a statute if it is inconsistent with the
statutory language or congressional intent.
C.B.S. Imports Corp. v. United States, 80 Cust. Ct. 61, 66 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
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U.S. taxpayers and market actors. Absent from the legislative history is
a discussion of the potential negative or positive effects of deemed liqui-
dation for the government or U.S. industry.1 8 1 The legislative history
would support an argument that the negative consequences of deemed
liquidation should apply only against the government.
A counter-argument is that Section 1504 in its current interpretation
fulfills congressional intent because it creates certainty and finality for
importers regardless of whether deemed liquidation results in negative
consequences to importers or not. Indeed, the duty liability is certain and
final at the time deemed liquidation occurs. From that time on, the im-
porter no longer has to suffer from the negative effects of an uncertain
liability. While congressional concern with "finality" to a certain extent
is answered even when deemed liquidation applies against importers,
equity dictates that the government act in a timely manner to prevent a
negative outcome for importers because, whether or not liquidation is
completed in a timely manner is within the exclusive control of the gov-
ernment. Congress' main motivator in enacting Section 1504 was to
minimize delays in the process.' 82 It is questionable whether delays will
be minimized by deemed liquidation in a system where the government
may have incentives to delay, such as in the overpayment situation. Of
course, courts operate under the presumption that U.S. agencies act in a
diligent manner and that any delays are caused solely by nonfeasance as
opposed to malfeasance.183 Regardless of the propensity of the govem-
ment to willfully delay liquidation, the current scheme certainly provides
an incentive to do so. Therefore, it would be consistent with congres-
sional intent to apply the negative consequences of deemed liquidation
only against the government. One commentator even has gone so far as
181. The Senate Committee on Finance estimated in 1978 that the enactment of the provision
would result in a "maximum annual customs revenue loss of $9.5 million." See S. REP., supra note
6, at 32. The sum $9.5 million in 1978 would equal between S21.9 and 45.4 million today See
Economic History Services, What is its Relative Value in US Dollars?, http://eh.net/hmit/compare.
More interestingly, the total value of imports in 1978 was $176 million. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 1 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf. The sum $176 million would equal between $406 and 842
million today. See Economic History Services, supra. The total value of imports in 2004 amounted
to almost $1,500 billion. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Int'l Trade in Goods &
Services July 2005, Exhibit I (Sept. 13, 2005), http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-
Release/currentpress release/exh I .pdf.
182. See, e.g., Customs Administration and Valuation of Imports: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong. 25 (1975) (answers by the Treas-
ury Department to questions submitted by the Hon. William J. Green, Chairman of the subcommit-
tee); see S. REP., supra note 6, at 32.
183. See, e.g., Spezzaferro v. F.A.A., 807 F.2d 169, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)
("Government officials are presumed to carry out their duties in good faith.... Unsubstantiated
suspicions and allegations are not enough. The proof must be almost 'irrefragable."'); Kalvar Corp.,
Inc. v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 192, 198 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (citing Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl.
605, 612 (Ct. Cl. 1959)) ("Any analysis of a question of Governmental bad faith must begin with the
presumption that public officials act 'conscientiously in the discharge of their duties."').
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to argue that deemed liquidation was intended to be a penalty on the
government for failure to act in time.
184
An added wrinkle to an argument based on legislative history is the
recent decision in Tianjin Machinery Import & Export Corp. v. United
States.185  In Tianjin, the CIT held that the DOC's practice of sending
liquidation instructions to Customs within fifteen days of the publication
of final results after administrative review conflicted with the statutory
right of the interested parties to appeal the DOC's decision to the CIT
within sixty days. 186 The government argued that it would be administra-
tively unwise to wait sixty days before sending liquidation instructions to
Customs because liquidation is time-consuming and Customs, then, may
not have enough time to liquidate within the six-month deemed liqui-
dated period.
8 7
The court rejected the argument finding that the DOC had failed to
explain why a sixty-day wait would be "administratively unwise.'
188
From a policy standpoint, the CIT noted that the DOC's practice might
"compel parties, in every instance, to seek a preliminary injunction
within fifteen days to prevent liquidation and preserve the Court's juris-
diction, regardless of whether the party ultimately decides to [file an ap-
peal]."' 189 Under Tianjin, the DOC must wait 60 days before sending
liquidation instructions to Customs.
The court's decision in Tianjin is consistent with prior court deci-
sions finding that suspension of liquidation is removed upon the expira-
tion of the time for an appeal of the DOC's decision. 190 However, it
gives rise to some tension with the line of cases holding that publication
in the Federal Register of final results constitutes notice to Customs of
the removal of the suspension of liquidation.191 Section 1504(d) provides
that Customs has six months to liquidate entries. 192 The six month time
period starts to run when the DOC publishes final results in the FederalRegister. 193 Under Tianjin, the DOC must wait sixty days after making a
final determination before sending liquidation instructions to Customs.
184. Lawrence M. Segan, Deemed Liquidation: Whose Rate is This Anyway?, 10 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 689, 704-06 (1987) (addressing whether the deemed liquidation rate should be the rate
asserted by the importer or the rate asserted by Customs).
185. 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
186. Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1309-10.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1310. The court found the DOC's argument was "conveniently vague and entirely
fail[ed] to address exactly how 'time-consuming' the liquidation process [was]." Id.
189. Id. at 1309.
190. See, e.g, Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g
granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004) ("[T]he suspension of liquidation under 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(c)(2) cannot be removed until the time for petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari ex-
pires." (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
191. See Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-82; Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that "[p]ublication of the final results in the Federal Register constitutes
notice to Customs within the meaning of section 1504(d)").
192. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
193. Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1381-82; Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1275.
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Provided that the DOC publishes final results in the Federal Register in
close proximity to making its final determination,' 94 Customs may have
as little as four months left to liquidate before deemed liquidation occurs.
In Section 1504(d), Congress explicitly provided a six-month time period
during which Congress must liquidate. Under Tianjin, the time period
effectively has been reduced to four months which appears contrary to
congressional intent as expressed in the current version of Section
1504(d). However, Congress does not appear to have put any particular
relevance on the length of the liquidation period when comparing previ-
ous versions of Section 1504. Earlier versions required liquidation
within ninety days of the removal of the suspension of liquidation.1 95 In
those earlier versions of Section 1504, Congress considered ninety days
long enough to liquidate. Therefore, the effective four-month time pe-
riod to liquidate resulting from the decision in Tianjin would be long
enough when judged by Congress' intent in prior versions of the statute.
Furthermore, the CIT in Tianjin did not appear categorically op-
posed to the government's argument that the sixty-day wait was "admin-
istratively unwise."' 96 The court merely found that the DOC's argument
was "conveniently vague and entirely fail[ed] to address exactly how
'time-consuming' the liquidation process [was]. 197 It would appear that
the CIT would have been willing to further entertain the argument had
the DOC provided a full explanation of its position. Therefore, given an
opportunity to further elaborate, the government may provide a more
persuasive explanation which potentially could influence the CIT to
reach a different position.
Amending the statute or re-interpreting it to only apply against the
government would prevent the negative effect of deemed liquidation for
an importer. Under this suggested revision, the government would be
obligated to refund overpaid antidumping duties regardless of whether
deemed liquidation has occurred. But, deemed liquidation would still
prevent the government from collecting additional antidumping duties in
case of underpayment of duties. Obviously, this solution would not take
care of the concerns of representative of U.S. industry. In addition, this
solution would not fully take care of the importer's concern with carry-
ing uncertain liabilities for long periods of time.
194. The DOC is not under a statutory deadline to publish final results of an administrative
review. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2000). But, the DOC must publish in the Federal Register the
final results of a court decision within ten days. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(f) (2000).
195. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (1978).
196. See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1310 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2004).
197. Id.
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IV. POSSIBLE JUDICIAL REMEDIES: INADEQUACY OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS, WRITS OF MANDAMUS, INJUNCTIONS AND COMPELLING
AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE APA
A party injured by delay or error in the liquidation process has ac-
cess to a number of judicial remedies. In addition to the more traditional
remedies, federal courts also may compel agency action under the Ad-
ministrative Protective Act' 98 ("APA").
There are two administrative agencies whose delay in the liquida-
tion process may give rise to negative effects: Customs and the DOC.
Customs is obligated to liquidate an entry within six months of receiving
notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation. 99 If Customs
fails to do so, the entries are deemed liquidated at the duty rate paid upon
entry.200 Reviewing courts have found that Customs receives notice of
the removal of the suspension of liquidation upon publication by the
DOC in the Federal Register of the final results of an administrative re-
view or judicial appeal, or in the absence of publication, by receiving
actual notice in unambiguous, public liquidation instructions from the
DOC.20 1 The DOC's failure to provide such notice prevents the six-
month deemed liquidation time period from starting. 20 2 Consequently, a
party may be interested in compelling the DOC to issue timely liquida-
tion instructions to Customs or compelling Customs to liquidate in a
timely manner.
Judicial remedies available include requesting a declaratory judg-
ment, an injunction, a writ of mandamus, or other remedies to "compel
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. ''20 3 How-
ever, those remedies are inadequate to safeguard the interests involved
both from a pragmatic and policy standpoint.
A. Declaratory Judgment
A declaratory judgment may serve as an acceptable remedy in cer-
tain situations but cannot undo deemed liquidation once it has occurred.
A party may request a declaratory judgment that deemed liquidation has
198. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2000).
199. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
200. Id.
201. See Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Fujitsu Gen.
Am. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281
F.3d 1268, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2000), rehg granted, No. 04-1058e (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004).
202. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 ("The Court of International Trade correctly held that.
notice purporting to lift the suspension of liquidation was not [published] and, as such, failed to
commence the six-month statutory period.").
203. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000). The CIT has exclusive jurisdiction of the enforcement by
Customs of laws and regulations over imports. Anderson v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 975, 977
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (citing Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The
CIT has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000).
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or has not occurred. 2 4  In the underpayment situation, a declaratory
judgment that deemed liquidation has occurred is useful to an importer as
a "shield" against the government's enforcement action to collect addi-
tional duties owed.2 °5 Similarly, in the overpayment situation, a declara-
tory judgment may be useful to an importer to prevent Customs from
erroneously liquidating entries as deemed liquidated.20 6 But, an importer
has little incentive to request a declaratory judgment that deemed liquida-
tion has not occurred in the underpayment situation because the importer
then would potentially have to pay additional duties on top of the cash
deposits already paid. Similarly, an importer would not benefit from a
declaratory judgment that deemed liquidation has occurred in the over-
payment situation. Obviously, the opposite situations would pertain to
representatives of U.S. industry but their access to judicial remedies is
limited.0 7
The biggest flaw of a declaratory judgment is that it cannot undo
deemed liquidation if it already has occurred.0 8 Therefore, a declaratory
judgment is an inadequate remedy for both importers and representatives
of U.S. industry, to the extent available to U.S. industry, when deemed
liquidation already has occurred.
B. Writ of Mandamus20 9
Before the enactment of the APA, a party had to request that a court
issue a writ of mandamus or an injunction to compel action by govern-
204. See, e.g., Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2000) ("[Where] an importer believes its entries were deemed liquidated under [19 U.S.C.] §
1504(d), and Customs has not actively liquidated the entries anew, the importer's only remedy, at
that point, is to seek a declaratory judgment from the CIT confirming that there was a deemed liqui-
dation under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).").
205. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(construing United States v. Sherman & Sons, Co., 237 U.S. 146 (1915)) (stating that once the
government's cause of action expires through deemed liquidation, Customs cannot breathe new life
into it by liquidating the entry anew).
206. Note that the importer must protest such Customs action under 19 U.S.C. § 1514. See,
e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1323-25 (finding that Customs' liquidation decision becomes final and
conclusive on all persons under § 1514(a)(5) regardless of legality); Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1557
("[L]iquidation is 'final and conclusive' ... when the liquidation has not been protested in accor-
dance with the provisions of section 1514."); LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 991 F.
Supp. 668, 676 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) ("A decision to liquidate, including the legality of the liquida-
tion itself, becomes final unless a protest of the decision is filed ....").
207. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1322 (noting that U.S. industry does not have any "avenue of relief for
improper liquidation" under the current statutory scheme). In Cemex, the Federal Circuit noted that
representatives of U.S. industry had access to prospective remedies under 19 U.S.C. § 1516 to con-
test Customs' decisions regarding appraisal, classification or duty rates applied to imported goods
and also to judicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings under 19 U.S.C. §
1516a. Id. Neither § 1516 nor § 1516a permits U.S. industry to challenge Customs' liquidations
after-the-fact. Id. at 1323.
208. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 (noting that deemed liquidation occurs as an
operation of law and, therefore, cannot be reversed). See also Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 306
F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273-74 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000); Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States, 951 F.
Supp. 241, 247 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996).
209. Black's Law Dictionary defines a writ of mandamus as "[a] writ issued by a superior court
to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties
correctly." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th Ed. 1999).
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ment officials. Today, federal courts, such as the CIT, still have the
power to issue writs of mandamus under the All Writs Act.21° It appears
that neither the CIT nor the Federal Circuit has ever issued a writ of
mandamus to compel Customs or the DOC to act in a timely manner.
The CIT has stated that the issuance of a writ of mandamus is "an
extraordinary equitable remedy which should be employed to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty specifically enjoined by law where
performance has been refused, and no meaningful alternative remedy
exists., 211 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the key prerequisite
for a writ of mandamus to issue is the presence of an obligation to act in
a ministerial capacity leaving the agency no discretion as to whether to
act.212 Unreasonable delays in the agency performance of ministerial
duties may also constitute sufficient basis for a writ of mandamus to is-
sue.213 The CIT and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit both agree
that a reviewing court must ensure that agencies comply with statutory
deadlines in a timely manner.2 1 4 "Regardless of [whether the statutory
time frame] is mandatory or directory, the Court has a duty to determine
'whether the agency's delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.'' 215
1. Writ of Mandamus to Compel Customs Action
Customs' obligation to liquidate fits the CIT's test for issuing a writ
of mandamus. However, a writ of mandamus is an ineffective remedy to
compel Customs to liquidate in a timely manner under the current
scheme.
Section 1504(d) of title 19 provides that Customs must liquidate an
entry within six months of receiving notice of the removal of the suspen-
sion of liquidation.216 Customs' involvement in the liquidation process is
ministerial in nature because the DOC determines the duty rate to apply
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). The CIT has the power to issue a writ of mandamus
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1585, 1651(a), and 2643(c)(1) (2000). Nakajima All Co. v. United States, 691 F.
Supp. 358, 361 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (citing Sharp Corp. v. United States, 837 F.2d 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1988)). Section 2643(c)(1) provides that: "[T]he Court of International Trade may... order any
other form of relief that is appropriate in a civil action, including, but not limited to, declaratory
judgments, orders of remand, injunctions, and writs of mandamus and prohibition." 28 U.S.C. §
2643(c)(1) (2000).
211. Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361 (quoting UST, Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 5 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986), affdon other grounds, 831 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The CIT issues a writ of
mandamus provided that there is: "(1) a clear right of the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a clear
duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) absence of an adequate alternative
remedy." Timken Co. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 373, 375 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
212. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
213. See Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361 ("Unreasonable delays in the agency performance of
ministerial duties may also constitute sufficient basis for a writ of mandamus to issue.") (citing UST,
Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 5 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), af d on other grounds, 831 F.2d 1028
(Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 617, 621 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988).
214. Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361 (citing Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 797 (D.C.
Cir.1987)).
215. Id.
216. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (2000).
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and Customs merely liquidates entries using the pre-determined rate.217
Thus, Customs has no discretion in deciding whether to act, within which
time frame to act or which duty rate to employ. Therefore, Customs'
obligation to liquidate appears to fall squarely within the parameters
within which the CIT issues a writ of mandamus because Customs is
under a clear obligation to liquidate within six months of receiving notice
of the removal of suspension of liquidation. As noted by the CIT in Tim-
ken v. United States218 , the law not only authorizes the demanded action
(i.e. liquidation), it requires it.
21 9
Similarly, Section 1500(e) imposes an absolute obligation on Cus-
toms to issue liquidation notices to, among others, importers.220 While
this obligation is absolute, Section 1500(e) does not contain any time
frame within which Customs must act. Hence, this notice obligation
leaves some discretion to Customs as to timing and a party would only
be able to enforce the obligation after unreasonable delay. Customs is
not under an obligation to notify representatives of U.S. industry about
liquidation decisions.
2 21
Arguably, the availability of an administrative remedy for importers
in the form of a protest filed under 19 U.S.C. Section 1514 could serve as
another, meaningful, alternative remedy, thereby precluding the issuance
of a writ of mandamus under CIT case law.2 22 However, the filing, and
subsequent denial by Customs, of a protest is essentially a prerequisite
for judicial review under Section 1514(a) and the doctrine of exhaustion
of judicial remedies. Therefore, the CIT's no-meaningful-alternative-
remedy requirement for issuing a writ of mandamus should not be an
obstacle for importers. Representatives of U.S. industry may not protest
Customs' liquidations and, therefore, do not have access to any meaning-
ful, alternative remedy.
In the end, obtaining a writ of mandamus is an inadequate remedy
for importers and representatives of U.S. industry. In the underpayment
situation, U.S. industry would want to compel Customs to liquidate be-
fore deemed liquidation occurs in order to achieve the full protection
afforded by U.S. trade laws, while importers would want to compel Cus-
toms to issue a notice that deemed liquidation has occurred after the fact.
217. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1324 ("Customs' role in making antidumping decisions.., is gener-
ally ministerial."); see Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169 (Ct.
Int'l Trade. 2004) ("In implementing the instructions of Commerce to liquidate entries subject to an
antidumping or countervailing duty order, Customs' actions are ministerial in nature.") (citing
Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Prods. Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2003)); Fujitsu Ten Corp. of Am. v. United States, 957 F. Supp. 245, 248 (1997); Am. Hi-Fi
Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1340, 1342-43 (1995); see Cust. HQ 230339, supra
note 71.
218. 715 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
219. See Timken, 751 F. Supp. at 375.
220. 19 U.S.C. § 1500(e) (2000).
221. See id.
222. See, e.g., Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at 361.
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The roles are reversed in the overpayment situation where U.S. industry
would want to compel Customs to issue a notice that deemed liquidation
has occurred after the fact, and the importer would want to compel Cus-
toms to liquidate before deemed liquidation occurs in order to obtain a
refund. The problem associated with requesting a writ of mandamus to
compel Customs to liquidate is that deemed liquidation cannot be undone
after the fact. A writ of mandamus would, therefore, only be useful if
issued before deemed liquidation has occurred. But, before deemed liq-
uidation has occurred, Customs has not yet violated its statutory duty to
liquidate and is not guilty of unreasonable delay as the six-month time
period for liquidation has not yet expired. 23 Arguably, the CIT should
not issue a writ under its current case law before expiration of the statu-
torily mandated time frame. Hence, a writ of mandamus could never be
issued.
Nevertheless, the CIT has noted in dictum that a writ of mandamus
would be appropriate to compel Customs to liquidate in a correct and
timely manner. 224 It would appear that the CIT believes that a writ of
mandamus could be issued under these circumstances. If so, and if is-
sued before deemed liquidation has occurred, a writ of mandamus could
provide the necessary relief for importers and U.S industry. However,
the CIT has never actually issued a writ of mandamus in that situation.
Finally, a writ of mandamus could prove useful in compelling Cus-
toms to recognize that deemed liquidation has occurred. For example, in
the underpayment situation, importers might be interested in using
deemed liquidation as a "shield" against the government's enforcement
action to collect additional duties owed. 225  However, a declaratory
judgment might be a better vehicle for this.226 Nevertheless, a writ of
mandamus could serve the same purpose.
2. Writ of Mandamus to Compel DOC Action
A writ of mandamus could be an effective remedy to compel the
DOC to provide notice to Customs of the removal of the suspension of
liquidation. Under current case law, however, it appears that the CIT
only would compel the DOC to issue notice of the final duty liability
after an appeal but would not compel issuance of a notice after comple-
tion of an administrative review or the issuance of liquidation instruc-
223. See § 1504(d) (2000).
224. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 110 F. Supp. at 1078 (noting that judicial action might compel Com-
merce to act in a timely and proper manner).
225. See, e.g., Cherry Hill, 112 F.3d at 1559 (stating that once the government's cause of
action expires (through deemed liquidation), Customs cannot breathe new life into it by liquidating
the entry anew). Conversely, representatives of U.S. industry might be interested in compelling
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tions to Customs because the former is subject to statutory deadline
while the latter two are not.
To issue a writ of mandamus, the CIT requires, among other things,
that the agency has failed to take action mandated by statute.227 The
DOC is not under a statutory obligation to issue liquidation instructions
to Customs. Hence, the CIT would not issue a writ of mandamus to
compel the DOC to issue liquidation instructions to Customs because the
DOC is not required to do so by statute. This result is not problematic
under the current scheme, provided that the DOC publishes final results
in the Federal Register, because the Federal Circuit has determined that
publication in the Federal Register constitutes notice to Customs that the
suspension of liquidation has been removed, thereby starting the six-
month time period for deemed liquidation.22 8
In contrast, the DOC is under an obligation to publish notice of the
final results of an administrative review but is not subject to any dead-
line. 229 The duty to publish notice, therefore, appears to fall within the
CIT's test for issuing a writ of mandamus because the DOC is subject to
a statutory mandate. However, the absence of a statutory deadline leaves
the agency with some discretion as to when to publish which could in-
crease the burden of persuasion of the requesting party. The CIT appears
to focus its inquiry on whether the agency has "refused" to act and, there-
fore, will not issue a writ if the agency promises to take prompt action or
has a "good cause" explanation for the delay.230 In light of this, a writ of
mandamus might an adequate remedy de jure but not de facto.
Finally, the DOC must publish notice of a court decision after ap-
peal within 10 days of the decision under Section 1516a. t In Timken,
the CIT granted a writ of mandamus to compel the DOC to comply with
232the ten-day publication rules. Hence, as illustrated by Timken, a writ
227. Nakajima, 691 F. Supp at 361 (citing UST Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1, 5 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1986), afidon other grounds, 831 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The CIT will issue a writ
of mandamus provided that there is: "(1) a clear right of the plaintiff to the relief sought; (2) a clear
duty on the part of the defendant to do the act in question; and (3) absence of an adequate alternative
remedy." Timken, 715 F. Supp. at 375.
228. Int'l Trading Co., 412 F.3d at 1313; Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1383; Int'l Trading Co. v. United
States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that the six-month time period begins to run
upon publication of final results in the Federal Register).
229. See 19 U.S.C. § 167 1(a) (2000).
230. See, e.g., Daido Corp. v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 533, 536 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992)
(declining to issue a writ of mandamus after the DOC's fifteen-year delay where the DOC agreed to
take action within an agreed-upon time frame); Sharp Corp. v. United States, 725 F. Supp. 549, 556
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus after noting that long delays were not
caused solely by the DOC's refusal to act but rather also by the importer); Nakajima, 691 F. Supp. at
359 (declining to issue a writ of mandamus where the DOC indicated that it would take prompt
action).
231. 19 U.S.C. §1516(f) (2000).
232. Timken, 715 F. Supp. at 378. The ten-day publication rule subsequently was dubbed
"Timken notice." The issue in Timken was whether the DOC was under an obligation to publish
such notice within ten days after the CIT decision in the case. Id. at 374. The court found in the
affirmative. Id. at 378. Hence, Timken Co., a domestic producer, was entitled to a writ of manda-
mus to force the DOC to publish in the Federal Register the results after judicial review of the under-
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of mandamus would serve as an adequate remedy to compel the DOC to
publish final results after judicial appeals. However, the number of final
determinations after completion of administrative reviews greatly out-
numbers the number of court decisions after appeal. Hence, the statutory
mandate in Section 1516a providing prompt notice of results after judi-
cial appeals should be replicated in Section 1675 to provide prompt no-
tice of results after administrative reviews.
C. Injunctions
233
An injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy which can be
used to either prevent an agency from taking a particular action or to
234compel agency action. As with a writ of mandamus, an injunction will
not solve the problems associated with deemed liquidation: before expi-
ration of the six-month time period, the importer has not suffered any
harm and an injunction could not be issued, after expiration, deemed
liquidation cannot be undone and an injunction would have no effect.
A moving party is not likely to be successful in requesting an in-
junction to compel Customs to liquidate in a timely manner. The CIT
issues an injunction if the movant can show that: "(1) without ... the
injunction, [the movant] will suffer irreparable harm; (2) the balance of
hardships weighs in [the movant's] favor; (3) it is likely that [the
movant] succeed on the merits of the case; and (4) granting the ... in-
junction will not run counter to the public's interest., 23' No doubt,
deemed liquidation will result in hardship to at least one of the parties
involved in a Customs transaction. The problem is that a party will only
suffer hardship after deemed liquidation has occurred. Hence, a moving
party would be unable to show hardship until after that. At that time,
deemed liquidation cannot be undone and an injunction would be inef-
fective. Thus, an injunction would only be useful if issued before
deemed liquidation has occurred. However, the CIT is unlikely to issue
an injunction at that time because of the lack of hardship.
Similarly, a moving party is not likely to be successful in requesting
an injunction to compel the DOC to provide notice of the removal of
lying proceeding. Id. The court found that it was "unlawful for Commerce to hold in abeyance the
effectiveness of the final decision" of the court beyond the statutory deadline. Id. at 376.
233. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully explore the CIT and Federal Circuit's use of
injunctions in antidumping proceedings.
234. See Ugine-Savoie Imphy v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000)
(noting that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy). A movant may request an injunc-
tion to prohibit an agency from taking action, as in Anderson v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 975, 977
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), or to compel agency action, as in Johnson v. Guhl, 91 F. Supp. 2d 754, 759
(D.N.J. 2000).
235. SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004) (citing
NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000)). See also
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (discussing the basis for injunctive
relief). Additionally, "the court 'balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction."' Id. at 312
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440, (1944)).
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suspension of liquidation. The lack of notice in itself does not amount to
hardship for the parties. As illustrated, an injunction is not an adequate
remedy for parties involved in Customs transactions.
D. Compelling Agency Action Under the APA
236
The APA generally allows both importers and representatives of the
U.S. industry to seek judicial review of agency action.23 7 However,
standing to challenge agency decisions in the liquidation process is lim-
ited to importers. Under the APA, reviewable actions include "[a]gency
action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court."238 The scope of review is
provided for in APA section 706 which includes compelling "agency
action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed., 239 It appears that
neither the CIT nor the Federal Circuit has used APA Section 706(1) to
compel Customs or the DOC to act in a timely manner.
The Supreme Court has found that, under the APA, courts may
compel only agency action required by law.2 40  Federal courts may
"compel an agency 'to perform a ministerial or non-discretionary act,' or
'to take action upon a matter, without directing how it shall act."' 24 1
Thus, a court may compel agency action within a statutorily required
time period but may not specify what that action must be (provided the
substance of the act is left to the discretion of the agency).2 42 In addition,
courts may compel agency action unreasonably delayed. Generally,
courts will defer to the agency so long as no significant prejudice has
resulted to the party seeking relief from the delay.243 Thus, an importer
seeking to show an "unreasonable delay" on the part of Customs or the
DOC would need to meet a fairly high quantum of proof.
Customs is required by statute to liquidate entries within six months
of receiving notice of the removal of the suspension of liquidation.2 "
APA Section 706(1) does not provide a remedy before liquidation has
occurred. That is, a party cannot use APA Section 706(1) to force Cus-
236. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore fully the role of APA § 706(1) in the con-
text of agency inaction. Instead, the discussion focuses on the application of § 706(1), in its current
interpretation, to the liquidation process.
237. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action ...is entitled to judicial review thereof."); see
generally Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 828-29 (1985) (discussing judicial review under the
APA).
238. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000); see generally Heckler, 470 U.S. at 828-29 (discussing judicial
review under the APA).
239. 5 U.S.C. § 706(l)(2000); see generally Heckler, 470 U.S. at 828-29 (discussing judicial
review under the APA).
240. See, e.g., Norton, 542 U.S. at 63 ("This limitation appears in § 706(l)'s authorization for
courts to 'compel agency action unlawfully withheld."').
241. Id. (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
108 (1947)).
242. Id. at 65.
243. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 782 F.2d 263, 268-69 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
244. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
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toms to liquidate in a timely manner because before deemed liquidation
has occurred, agency action has not been unlawfully withheld nor has
there been unreasonable delay. But, under the plain meaning of the pro-
vision, a party should be able to use APA Section 706(1) to provide a
remedy after deemed liquidation has occurred. Deemed liquidation oc-
curs because an agency has failed to act within a statutorily imposed
deadline. Arguably, such inaction constitutes "agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed" remediable under APA Section
706(1). Regardless, Customs and courts take the position that deemed
liquidation cannot be undone after it has occurred.245 Therefore, under
current precedent, APA Section 706(1) cannot remedy Customs' delay in
liquidating.
However, if some of the suggestions described in this article were
implemented, APA Section 706(1) could serve as an adequate remedy.
For example, provided deemed liquidation only occurs against the gov-
ernment, importers could use Section 706(1) to force Customs to liqui-
date after expiration of the six-month time period. It would be unwise,
however, to also allow the U.S. government and representatives of U.S.
industry access to a remedy under Section 706(1) to undo deemed liqui-
dation. Allowing this would contravene congressional intent to protect
importers by inserting certainty in the process because liquidation would
never be final. Of course, adopting other suggestions made in this article
might obviate the need for a remedy under APA Section 706(1). For
example, the creation of a new, administrative remedy would supplant
the use of Section 706(1).
In contrast, the DOC is not under a statutory deadline to publish fi-
nal results after concluding an administrative review or to send liquida-
tion instructions to Customs. 24 6 Because the Federal Circuit has found
that the six-month time period for deemed liquidation starts to run upon
publication of final results,247 the DOC's inaction might result in the six-
month time period for deemed liquidation never starting. In Norton, the
Supreme Court held that only agency action statutorily mandated can be
compelled under the APA.248 Therefore, because the DOC is under no
legal obligation to publish notice, a party cannot compel the DOC to act
245. See, e.g., Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding
that an importer was not entitled to a refund of duties paid for entries which were deemed liqui-
dated); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11 (holding that Customs is unable to reliquidate entries
already deemed liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note I I (denying a refund because entries
were deemed liquidated).
246. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1) (2000). However, the DOC is under an obligation to publish
in the Federal Register the final results of a court decision after appeal within ten days. 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(c), (e) (2000).
247. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co., 412 F.3d at 1313; Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1380 ("Commerce's
publication of notice ... in the Federal Register ... constituted notice to Customs .... ); Int'l Trad-
ing Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
248. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 63.
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under APA Section 706(1). Instead, a party must seek to compel agency
action "unreasonably withheld."
E. Imposition of Judicial Deadlines
Lastly, another possible remedy for agency inaction is the imposi-
tion of judicial deadlines within which the agency must act in cases
where a particular statute does not contain any deadlines. 249 Judicially
imposed deadlines might be appropriate to force the DOC to publish the
final results of an administrative review and to issue liquidation instruc-
tions to Customs as the DOC currently is not under any statutory dead-
lines to do S.250
However, federal case law has established the principle that courts
are hesitant to impose judicial deadlines in the absence of congressional
acquiescence. In Heckler v. Day,25t the Supreme Court refused to im-
pose judicial deadlines on the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
adjudicating social security disability benefit claims because Congress
had not. The complainants argued that the delays violated their statutory
right to a "hearing within a reasonable time. 252 The Court found that
Congress was aware of the problem but nevertheless had repeatedly de-
clined to impose mandatory deadlines to prevent delays. 2 3  The Court
found that congressional concern with the quality and uniformity of
agency decisions had prevailed over considerations of timeliness.25 4 In
that situation, according to the Court, judicially imposed deadlines would
constitute "an unwarranted judicial intrusion into [a] pervasively regu-
lated area., 25 5 Similarly, it is unlikely that the CIT would impose judicial
deadlines on the DOC when Congress has not.
F. Public Policy Considerations
The currently available judicial remedies are inadequate to remedy
the problems associated with the liquidation process. Most glaringly,
courts cannot undo deemed liquidation once it has occurred. Even if
adequate judicial remedies were available, public policy dictates that the
249. As was previously described, in cases where a particular statute contains a deadline but it
does not attach any consequences for failure to meet it, courts find that those deadlines are "direc-
tory" as opposed to "mandatory" and that no consequence follows from failure to meet them. See,
e.g., Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 563, 566 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he lack
of consequential language ... leads us to conclude that Congress intended this [section] to be only
directory."); Alberta Gas Chem., Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 785 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981).
Hence, the courts have indicated that it is up to Congress to attach consequential language to the
statute, negating any attempt at a judicial remedy.
250. See Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004) (striking down the DOC's policy of issuing liquidation instructions to Customs within
fifteen days of making a final determination). This remedy is not an issue for Customs because
Customs is under a mandatory statutory obligation to liquidate. See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
251. 467 U.S. 104 (1984).
252. Id. at 108.
253. Id. at I11.
254. Id. at 113.
255. Id. at 119.
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problems associated with the liquidation process be resolved at the ad-
ministrative level as opposed to by judicial intervention. Therefore, a
statutory amendment is necessary to solve these problems.
First, judicial remedies require a party, who should be able to rely
on the involved administrative agencies performing their duties under the
statute, to take affirmative action in enforcing its rights at significant
cost. Courts have frequently expressed their frustration with agency de-
lay in the liquidation process. In NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v.
United States, 2 6 the CIT rejected the government's argument that the
rights of a party injured by the DOC's delay in publishing notices of final
results after administrative reviews were adequately protected by the
availability of a judicial remedy: a writ of mandamus.257  The CIT
stated, "[t]he idea that a party must seek such an extraordinary remedy to
ensure that Commerce simply fulfills its statutory responsibilities is un-
tenable. 258 Judicial economy dictates that agencies diligently exercise
their statutory mandates thereby obviating the need for judicial review.
Second, agency inaction may thwart congressional intent and upset the
balance between coordinate branches of government. More importantly,
unchecked agency delay may negate trade concessions and rules care-
fully negotiated under the auspice of the WTO. Third, recourse to judi-
cial remedies causes more delay in the liquidation process thereby exac-
erbating the negative effects associated therewith, at least for importers.
Finally, access to judicial remedies is a burden on the moving party and
costs significant sums of money, thereby causing further injury. In addi-
tion, judicial review of agency inaction is truly only an effective check
on the executive branch in situations where the benefit of obtaining the
remedy outweighs the associated costs. That is, there is a "twilight zone"
in which no party would find it cost-efficient to seek a judicial remedy
because the costs, e.g. for legal representation, of doing so would be lar-
ger than the potential gain. In these "small-stake" situations, an agency
is effectively insulated from challenge and has little incentive to dili-
gently monitor its actions. Of course, given the size of the administrative
process of liquidation, it is unlikely that an agency would have the ability
to single out small stake situations for less-than-optimal agency action.
For these reasons, judicial remedies should only be used as a last re-
sort to solve the problems in the liquidation process. Instead, the statu-
tory scheme must be amended to take care of the associated problems at
the administrative level.
256. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), affld, 411 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
257. Id. at 1346.
258. Id.
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V. THE CASE FOR A STATUTORY AMENDMENT CREATING DEADLINES
AND CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILING TO MEET THEM
The problems associated with the liquidation process under the cur-
rent scheme are caused by the DOC and Customs' delay in taking action.
The DOC publishes in the Federal Register the final results of an admin-
istrative review and sends liquidation instructions to Customs.2 5 9 After
receiving notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation, Customs
liquidates the covered entries.260 However, both agencies frequently fail
to act in a timely manner or, even worse, fail to act at all.2 61 The delays
cause injury to importers, the U.S. government, and representatives of
U.S. industry. Judicial remedies are inadequate to protect the parties
involved in the liquidation process from the negative consequences of
deemed liquidation. Therefore, statutory amendments are necessary to
solve the problems at the administrative agency level.
Section 1504(d) of title 19 U.S.C. provides both a time requirement
within which liquidation must occur and a consequence for Customs'
failure to meet it, deemed liquidation.2 62 In contrast, no consequences
follow from the DOC's failure to publish the final results of administra-
tive or judicial reviews.263 In fact, the DOC is not even under a statutory
deadline to publish the final results of an administrative review (unless
the final results were appealed under 19 U.S.C. Section 1516a).2 4 In
addition, the DOC is not under a statutory deadline to send liquidation
instructions to Customs (unless the final results were appealed under 19
U.S.C. Section 1516a).265 Publication in the Federal Register of final
results of an administrative review or the DOC's providing actual notice
259. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(c) (2000); 19 C.F.R. § 354.18 (2005); 19 C.F.R. § 351.207(b)
(2005).
260. 19 U.S.C. § 1500(d) (2000); 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(B); 19 C.F.R. §§ 159.2, 351.207(e)
(2005).
261. See, e.g., Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Cemex
S.A. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1314, 1316, 1317 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, No. 04-1058
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004); Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1268, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Daido Corp., v.
United States, 796 F. Supp. 533, 534-55 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992); Nakajima All Co. v. United States,
691 F. Supp. 358, 361 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Am. Permac, Inc. v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 1187,
1189 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) affd, 831 F.2d 269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
262. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000).
263. See 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(1) (2000) ("[The DOC] shall publish in the Federal Register the
results of [an administrative review], together with the notice of any duty to be assessed .... ); 19
U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(C) ("[The DOC] shall, within 10 days after the final disposition of [a judicial]
review ... transmit to the Federal Register for publication the final disposition and issue instructions
to the Customs Service with respect to the liquidation of entries pursuant to the review.").
264. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(3)(B)-(C) (2000). However, the DOC is under an obligation to
publish in the Federal Register final results of judicial reviews of administrative reviews within 10
days after a court decision. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(e), 1675(a)(3)(C) (2005). Courts which have
interpreted 19 U.S.C. Section 1516a(e)(2) have found it to be directory rather than mandatory. See,
e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 n.6 ("[S]ection 1516a(e) sets forth no consequences for failure to
comply with its publication requirement." (citing Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1382)); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at
1382 ("[T]here is no language in section 1516a(e) that attaches a consequence to a failure by Com-
merce to meet the ten-day publication requirement ...."); NEC Solutions, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346
(stating that the defendant was "technically correct" that Section 1516a(e) is directory rather than
mandatory).
265. See 19 U.S.C. §1675(a)(3)(C) (2000).
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of the removal of the suspension of liquidation to Customs through liqui-
dation instructions mark the start of the six-month time period for
deemed liquidation.266 Consequently, the DOC can prevent deemed liq-
uidation from ever occurring by not publishing the final results or failing
to send liquidation instructions to Customs.
Courts are generally hostile to imposing time limits on administra-
tive agencies in the absence of clear congressional intent.2 67 In addition,
the CIT and the Federal Circuit have found that "a statutory time period
is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency or public
official to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence
for failure to comply with the provisions. '268
The current notice regime appears to conflict with congressional in-
tent in enacting Section 1504 in 1978. Before Section 1504, there was
no statutory requirement that liquidation be completed within a specified
time limit.269  Congress enacted Section 1504 out of concern for the
negative effects delay in liquidation would have on importers and others
involved in customs transactions.270 One court noted that one of Con-
gress' concerns was that the DOC and Customs could delay liquidation
indefinitely prior to 1978.271 Despite the enactment of Section 1504,
under its current interpretation, the DOC still has the power to delay liq-
uidation indefinitely by failing to publish notice of the final results of an
administrative or judicial review, or failing to send liquidation instruc-
tions to Customs. 272 Of course, federal courts operate under the judicial
presumption that federal agencies exercise their duties in a diligent man-
ner.273 However, the frequently egregious delays in the liquidation proc-ess caused by the DOC and Customs have led courts to voice their frus-
266. Int'l Trading Co. v. United States, 412 F.3d 1303, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (post-URAA
entries); Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1376; Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1271 (pre-URAA entries). For infor-
mation on URAA, see supra note 72.
267. See, e.g., Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 112, 119 (1984) (finding that a court-ordered
injunction imposing an administrative deadline constituted an "unwarranted judicial intrusion"
where Congress had expressed concern over serious delays but nevertheless declined to impose a
deadline).
268. Alberta Gas Chem., Inc. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 780, 785 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981)
(citations omitted) cited in Canadian Fur Trappers Corp. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 364, 367 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988). See also Liesegang v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 312 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (noting that courts should refrain from imposing their own consequences when Congress fails
to specify a statutory consequence for failure to comply with a time deadline).
269. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31; See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 24.
270. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31.
271. Ambassador Div. of Florsheim Shoe v. United States, 748 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
272. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1321 (finding that Customs did not receive notice that the
suspension of liquidation had been lifted for purposes of § 1504(d) where the DOC had issued pre-
mature, non-public liquidation instructions to Customs and did not publish notice under § 1516a(e)).
273. See generally Spezzaferro v. FAA, 807 F.2d 169, 173 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)
("Government officials are presumed to carry out their duties in good faith.... Unsubstantiated
suspicions and allegations are not enough. The proof must be almost 'irrefragable."'); Kalvar Corp.,
Inc. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1301 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("Any analysis of a question of Govern-
mental bad faith must begin with the presumption that public officials act 'conscientiously in the
discharge of their duties."' (citing Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605, 612 (1959)).
[Vol. 83:2
2005] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 519
tration. For example, in NEC Solutions (America), Inc. v. United
States,274 the CIT stated that:
Commerce's self-imposed bureaucracy . . . is no excuse for delay.
Commerce is aware of its statutory obligations and should have
crafted its procedures accordingly. The Government brazenly claims
that an interested party who believes it will be injured by a delay "is
not without remedy" because it can seek relief by petitioning for a
writ of mandamus. The idea that a party must seek such an extraor-
dinary remedy to ensure that Commerce simply fulfills its statutory
responsibilities is untenable. By delaying liquidation in this manner,
Commerce undermines both the antidumping duty laws and Con-
gress' intent to settle importers' liabilities promptly .... [T]he court
finds no excuse for Commerce's failure to comply with the statute
and will likely craft future orders under the presumption that Com-
merce will fail to timely publish.275
To remedy the shortcomings of the current scheme, U.S. trade laws
should be amended to impose strict statutory deadlines within which the
DOC must publish in the Federal Register the final results of administra-
tive and judicial reviews, and issue liquidation instructions to Customs.
Failure to do so should result in some form of consequence to the gov-
ernment in order to make sure that the government does not have an in-
centive to delay action. For example, 19 U.S.C. Section 1675(a)(3)(C)
provides that the DOC must publish the final results after a judicial re-
view within ten days of the decision (and issue liquidation instructions to
Customs). Congress should enact the same or a similar rule for publica-
tion of the final results after an administrative review, and for sending
liquidation instructions to Customs, regardless of whether the review
274. 277 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003). In NEC Solutions, NEC had imported televi-
sion sets subject to an antidumping order between 1982 and 1989. Id. at 1341-43. NEC challenged
Customs' liquidation of two groups of entries, the fifth through eight review periods and the ninth
through tenth review periods. Id. at 1343-44. After judicial review of the fifth through eighth re-
view periods, the suspension of liquidation was automatically lifted in September 1999 but the DOC
did not publish the final results as required by 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e). Id. at 1342. In June 2000, the
DOC sent an informational email to Customs noting that "THERE SHOULD BE NO
UNLIQUIDATED ENTRIES" in the fifth through eighth review periods, requesting Customs to
report the statuts of the covered entries. Id. at 1342-43. In January and March 2001, the DOC
informed Customs that the suspension of liquidation had been lifted. Id. at 1343. Customs liqui-
dated the entries between February and June 2001 and NEC protested, arguing that the entries were
deemed liquidated. Id. Similarly, suspension of liquidation for the entries in the ninth through tenth
review periods was lifted in June 1996. Id. The DOC sent liquidation instructions to Customs in
April and May 2000 and Customs liquidated the entries between June and September 2000. Id.
NEC protested arguing that the entries were deemed liquidated. Id. at 1343-44.
275. NEC Solutions, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1346, n.15 (citation omitted). The CIT further noted
that:
In 2002 and the first four months of 2003, Commerce published a total of eight (8)
amended final determinations .... [N]one [of which] were published within [the requi-
site] ten days .... The most egregious violations occurred (a) 1 year and 3 months, (b) 3
years and I month, and (c) 5 years and 8 months after the reviewing courts' decision be-
came final. According to Defendant, there is presently one matter pending before [the
CIT] concerning the delay of eight years and two months. Such delays are unacceptable.
And, of course, here there was no publication at all.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
results were appealed. In addition, any such rule should contain a conse-
quence for failure to publish, currently absent even from Section
1675(a)(3)(C) which only contains a deadline. One way to do this would
be to explicitly provide that the six-month time period for deemed liqui-
dation starts to run at the expiration of the publication period, e.g., the
ten-day period in Section 1675(a)(3)(C).
Such statutorily-imposed consequences are found in 19 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1504(d) and other U.S. trade and customs law provisions. For ex-
ample, 19 U.S.C. Section 1499(c)(1) provides that Customs has five days
to determine whether to release or detain merchandise presented for ex-
amination. "Merchandise not released within such 5-day period shall be
considered to be detained merchandise. 276 Another subsection of the
same provision provides that a failure to make a final determination of
admissibility for detained goods within 30 days after the merchandise has
been presented for examination "shall be treated as a decision ... to ex-
clude the merchandise. 277 Similarly, 19 U.S.C. Section 1515(b) and (c)
provide that Customs' failure to act on requests for accelerated disposi-
tions of protest and to set aside denial of further review, respectively,
result in a deemed denial of the requests. 78
As illustrated, statutorily-imposed deadlines with consequences for
failure to act are already used in trade and customs law provisions and
Congress should amend the publication provisions similarly. Such
amendment would greatly enhance the transparency of the trade laws and
provide certainty for importers, consistent with congressional intent in
enacting Section 1504.279 The absence of statutory deadlines and conse-
quences in the relevant statutory provisions has left courts reluctant to
enforce rights accruing to parties negatively affected by agency delay.
Clear statutory deadlines with consequences attached would make
the liquidation process more efficient. By creating statutory deadlines,
the DOC and Customs would be under unambiguous obligations to act.
The DOC and Customs are unlikely to object to adhering to clear, statu-
tory mandates which would enable interested parties to enforce rights
accruing to them at the agency level without judicial intervention.
Should the agencies fail to take timely action, the application of conse-
quences for failure to act would allow courts to enforce the deadlines
because the deadlines would be mandatory, as opposed to directory.28 °
276. 19 U.S.C. §1499(c)(1) (2000).
277. 19 U.S.C. §1499(c)(5)(A). If Customs decides to "exclude" a particular good, it means
that it is not allowed into the Customs territory of the United States.
278. 19 U.S.C. §1515(b)(c) (2000).
279. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 31 (1978). See also H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 24.
280. See, e.g., Canadian Fur Trappers, 691 F. Supp. at 367 ("It is settled that 'a statutory time
period is not mandatory unless it both expressly requires an agency.., to act within a particular time
period and specifies a consequence for failure to comply with the provisions.") (citation omitted);
Philipp Bros. v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 1317, 1323 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) ("In several other
contexts courts have recognized that statutory time periods are directory, as opposed to mandatory,
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Courts would no longer be forced to show deference to agency promises
to take prompt action, as currently is the case.
Of course, clear statutory deadlines and attached consequences will
not prevent the negative effects of deemed liquidation once it has oc-
curred. Instead, the suggested statutory amendments described in this
section must be combined with other changes to the liquidation scheme.
For example, if deemed liquidation only applies against the government,
importers would not be concerned as much with the DOC's sending in-
structions to Customs because if Customs failed to liquidate in time, the
importer would not be injured in the overpayment situation. Therefore,
multiple, simultaneous amendments to U.S. trade and customs laws may
be necessary as the different suggested remedies are interdependent.
VI. A CASE FOR THE CREATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY TO
PROTECT AGAINST THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF DEEMED LIQUIDATION
There is no administrative remedy available for interested parties to
compel timely and accurate liquidation. More importantly, it appears
that there is no administrative remedy available that is capable of undo-
ing the negative effects of deemed liquidation. 281 Generally, importers
may protest Customs' liquidation decisions under 19 U.S.C. Section
1514.282 Representatives of U.S. industry have no similar right.283
Deemed liquidation cannot be protested under Section 1514: before
deemed liquidation has occurred, there is no decision to protest and after
it has occurred it cannot be undone.284 Therefore, U.S. customs law
should be amended to allow importers, and potentially representatives of
when no restraint is affirmatively imposed on the doing of the act after the time specified and no
adverse consequences are imposed for the delay.").
281. See supra text accompanying note 11.
282. 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5), (c)(3) (2000). Congress recently amended Section 1514 to give
importers 180 days to protest Customs decisions as opposed to the prior 90-day deadline. Miscella-
neous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-429, §2103(2)(A), 188 Stat.
2434, 2597-98 (2004). Section 1514 only allows an importer to challenge Customs decisions and
not DOC decisions. Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(stating that when Commerce is alleged to have committed an error in providing liquidation instruc-
tions, § 1514 does not apply). Instead, an action challenging the DOC's liquidation instructions is a
challenge to the administration and enforcement of final results, and accordingly finds its jurisdic-
tional basis in 28 U.S.C. Section 1581(i)(4). Id. at 1305 (citing Consol. Bearings Co. v. United
States, 348 F.3d 997, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
283. Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003), af'd,
384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
284. Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. In the majority of cases, courts
and Customs have stated that deemed liquidation cannot be protested or undone. See, e.g., Fujitsu
Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1380-82 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that only Cus-
toms decisions are protestable and that deemed liquidation occurs by operation of law and is not a
decision of Customs); Wolff Shoe Co. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
United States v. Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1558-1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fujitsu Gen.
Am., Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000), aftd, 283 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2002); see Cust. HQ 228929, supra note 11; see Cust. HQ 228712, supra note 11. How-
ever, in two recent cases, the CIT has indicated in dicta that deemed liquidation possibly could be
protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States, 350 F. Supp.
2d 1172, 1178 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004); Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
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U.S. industry, a way to preserve their rights in case of deemed liquida-
tion, either before or after it has occurred.
A. An Administrative Remedy for Importers
In general, an importer dissatisfied with Customs liquidation deci-
sions may protest such decisions within 180 days under 19 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1514.285 Section 1514 provides that Customs decisions are final and
conclusive unless protested.286 Hence, the statute grants a right of protest
to importers but also imposes a burden on them to diligently monitor the
liquidation of entries in order to preserve their right of protest; unless an
importer exercises its right to protest, its cause of action is waived.
Deemed liquidation is connected to the protest requirement in a
number of ways. First, deemed liquidation may occur because Customs
failed to liquidate an entry within the six-month time period after proper
notice of the removal of suspension of liquidation. For example, in Cus-
toms Headquarters Ruling HQ 228249,287 an importer imported bricks
from Mexico in 1986 and paid a preliminary unfair trade duty of 3.51
percent ad valorem. The DOC subsequently revoked the unfair trade
duty and, in May 1996, sent instructions to Customs to liquidate the im-
porter's entries of bricks at zero percent duty. Customs failed to do so
and discovered in July 1998, approximately twenty-five months after
receiving notice of the final duty liability, that the goods were deemed
liquidated at the 3.51 percent duty paid upon entry. Customs rejected the
importer's argument that it was entitled to a refund of the 3.51 percent
duty paid upon entry. Similarly, in the majority of cases, courts have
taken the position that deemed liquidation cannot be undone and that it is
not protestable, as it is not a Customs "decision" under Section 1514.288
285. The statute states:
[D]ecisions of the Customs Service... as to... (5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an
entry ... shall be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the United States and
any officer thereof) unless a protest is filed in accordance with this section, or unless a
civil action contesting the denial of a protest, in whole or in part, is commenced in the
United States Court of International Trade ... within the time prescribed by [28 U.S.C. §
2636] .... ).
19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5), (c)(3) (2000). See supra note 282 regarding a recent statutory amendment of
§ 1514.
286. 19 U.S.C. §1514(a)(5) (2000).
287. See Cust. HQ 228249, supra note 4.
288. See, e.g., Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1380-82; Wolff Shoe, 141 F.3d at 1122-23; Cherry Hill
Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1558-59; Fujitsu, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1069; LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v.
United States, 991 F. Supp. 668, 673 n.7 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997) (noting that Customs asserted that it
cannot reliquidate an entry that has been deemed liquidated); see Cust. HQ 228249, supra note 4.
Courts have not made a definitive finding on the issue. The Federal Circuit has held that 19 U.S.C.
Section 1514 does not apply to decisions made by other agencies, but only to Customs decisions
named in the statute. See Mitsubishi Elec. Am. Inc. v. United States, 44 F.3d 973, 976-77 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Deemed liquidation is not listed in § 1514 and because it only applies to Customs, and not to
the DOC, an importer cannot protest DOC decisions. Furthermore, the "final and conclusive" lan-
guage found in § 1514 refers to Customs decisions. 19 U.S.C. §1514 (2000). Arguably, if deemed
liquidation occurs by operation of law and not as a result of a Customs decision, it cannot become
conclusive and final on the parties under Section 1514. In two recent cases, the CIT has indicated in
dicta that deemed liquidation possibly could be protested under certain circumstances. See Norsk
Hydro, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1357 at 1362. The Federal Circuit stated in
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This means that an importer is not entitled to a refund in the overpay-
ment situation, but it also means that deemed liquidation is a defense,
even without a protest, in an enforcement action brought by the govern-
ment to collect additional duties owed in the underpayment situation.2 89
Second, a sub-set of the above-mentioned situation occurs when
Customs believes that deemed liquidation has occurred and issues a liq-
uidation notice to that effect. For example, in Cemex, S.A. v. United
States, 290 the DOC failed to publish notice of the final duty liability in the
Federal Register and also failed to send effective liquidation instructions
to Customs.291 Hence, the six-month time period for deemed liquidation
never started to run. 29 2 Nevertheless, about three years later, erroneously
believing that deemed liquidation had occurred, Customs posted public
notice to that effect.29 3 The Federal Circuit held that deemed liquidation
had not occurred but that Customs' liquidation notice to that effect had
become conclusive and final because the importer had failed to protest
the liquidation decision.294 The Cemex case is an example of a situation
in which the DOC's and Customs' failures to act in a diligent manner
may have serious implications for interested parties.
Third, deemed liquidation may occur because Customs erroneously
liquidated an entry as deemed liquidated contrary to an agency-imposed
suspension of liquidation. In that situation, courts have found that Cus-
toms' erroneous liquidation becomes conclusive and final unless the im-
porter protests the decision.295 Note, however, that in that situation, an
entry is not deemed liquidated by operation of law, but rather, Customs'
decision to consider it deemed liquidated becomes final and conclusive
on the parties.
Cemex that deemed liquidation can be protested. See Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 ("If a deemed
liquidation or any liquidation is adverse to an importer, it has its protest remedied under 19 U.S.C. §
1514 and access to judicial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)."). However, its statement appears to
have been limited to the facts of the case which involved Customs' decision to recognize entries as
deemed liquidated even though they were not. Id. at 1361-62 (distinguishing the facts in Cemex
from both Fujitsu and Int'l Trading). In Norsk Hydro, the CIT did not discuss the issue further but
indicated that, under certain, limited circumstances, there might be an administrative remedy avail-
able to importers under 19 U.S.C. Section 1520(c)(1) to undo deemed liquidation once it had oc-
curred. NorskHydro, 350 F. Supp. 2d. at 1178-79.
289. See, e.g., Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1558.
290. 384 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh 'g granted, No. 04-1058 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 14, 2004).
291. Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1314.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1317.
294. Id. at 1325.
295. See, e.g., id. at 1324-26; Juice Farms 68 F.3d at 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[A]II liquida-
tions, whether legal or not, are subject to the timely protest requirement."). In fact, any liquidation
occurring during an agency-ordered suspension of liquidation must be protested or it becomes final
and conclusive on all parties. Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559; Allegheny Bradford Corp. v.
United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004). Courts have consistently rejected
the proposition that "where a Customs decision violated an existing agency order, the decision was
void and the party was able to bypass the requirements of the protest procedure." Allegheny Brad-
fordCorp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (citing Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1557).
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Finally, the CIT has distinguished cases such as Juice Farm and
Cherry Hill, involving erroneous liquidations contrary to prior adminis-
trative decisions, from cases involving erroneous liquidation contrary to
court-ordered injunctions against liquidation.296 A preliminary injunction
against liquidation issued by the CIT in an appeal of an agency determi-
nation remains in effect until the CIT decision becomes final which is at
the time of the expiration of the appeals process. 297 Customs' purported
liquidation contrary to a court-ordered suspension of liquidation has "no
legal effect" and need not be protested.298 This result follows from the
fact that administrative agencies have no "authority ...to determine
whether a court-ordered injunction of liquidation should be enforced.,
299
In such a situation, courts have held the government in contempt of
court.3 ° °
As illustrated above, there are many ways in which deemed liquida-
tion can effectively occur. Customs can make a liquidation decision,
except if subject to a court-ordered suspension of liquidation, final and
conclusive on an importer regardless of the accuracy of the decision.
Congress created the protest procedure in Section 1514 to protect im-
porters from erroneous Customs action. The right to protest granted by
Section 1514, however, is coupled with an obligation on behalf of the
importer to exercise that right in a timely manner. If not, a consequence
for failure to act occurs: Customs' decision becomes final and conclu-
sive on all parties. The burden imposed on importers to monitor liquida-
tion of their entries appears equitable on its face. However, when viewed
in light of the sometimes lengthy delays in the liquidation protest, equity
may favor a different result. The time period between the DOC's deter-
mination of final duty liability and Customs liquidation may be lengthy,
296. See, e.g., Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. Courts issue such injunc-
tion during judicial review under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2). This provision allows CIT to enjoin
"some or all entries of merchandise covered by a determination of the... administering authority..
upon request by an interested party... " Fujitsu, 283 F.3d at 1382.
297. See PAM S.P.A. v. JCM, Ltd., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1367 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2004).
298. Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (citing LG Electronics, 991 F. Supp.
at 675; Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (citing LG Electronics, 991 F. Supp. at 675)). The CIT in
Allegheny Bradford Corp. went on to find that
Top Line is thus correct in arguing that the improper liquidations are void ab initio, and
that it is inappropriate to subject a legal nullity to reliquidation and other administrative
action before this Court may provide a remedy. "The proper means to enforce an order
of this Court against the Government is to seek relief in this Court; it is not to file a pro-
test with Customs."
Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (quoting Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Prod-
ucts Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2003)).
299. Allegheny Bradford Corp., 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. In Allegheny Bradford Corp., the
Government took the position that liquidation in violation of a court-ordered injunction was not yet
final under § 1514(b) and that the importer had to wait for the final court decision in the litigation.
Id. The CIT stated that "[t]his, of course, would allow the economic detriment of a liquidation and
exaction of funds to persist through the course of the litigation, thereby frustrating Congress' intent
to provide injunctive relief from liquidations pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1516a(c)." Id.
300. See, e.g., Yancheng, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1364 (holding the government in contempt of a
court-ordered preliminary injunction when it liquidated subject entries after the CIT entered judg-
ment in the case, as the injunction remained in effect pending the appeals process).
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sometimes several years.30  During this time, importers must spend
money monitoring their entries to assure that Customs does not impose
on them a final and conclusive erroneous liquidation decision. Thus,
importers must spend resources to assure that Customs diligently per-
forms its statutory duty. From this viewpoint, erroneous Customs deci-
sions should not become final and conclusive on importers, especially in
light of congressional intent in creating 19 U.S.C. Section 1504(d) to
provide finality and certainty for importer and others involved in Cus-
toms transactions.
A possible counter-argument is that Congress' concern with the
creation of finality and certainty for importers would still be served un-
der the current protest scheme because Customs decisions become final
and certain upon the expiration of the protest period. Arguably, Con-
gress was not necessarily concerned with the accuracy of Customs deci-
sions when enacting Sections 1504(d). Instead, Congress appeared
mainly concerned with the long-time periods during which importers
carried uncertain liabilities. 0 2 From this viewpoint, the finality aspect of
Section 1514 is of little concern because negative consequences will only
materialize if an importer fails to monitor its entries.
More troubling, however, is the fact that deemed liquidation cannot
be undone by protest once it has occurred.30 3 Regardless of how dili-
gently an importer monitors its entries, an importer has no available ad-
ministrative remedy to prevent deemed liquidation from occurring. Con-
gress enacted Section 1504(d) to protect importers against financial loss
304and uncertain liabilities caused by delays in the liquidation process.
Therefore, a revised liquidation scheme should allow importers access to
some form of administrative remedy to safeguard their interest in accu-
rate liquidation. Otherwise, importers have no protection against arbi-
trary agency action.30 5
301. See supra Parts II.A-B.
302. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32, cited in Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 n.5 (citing Dal-
Tile Corp. v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 394, 399 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993)). See also Int'l Trading,
281 F.3d at 1272; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1559.
303. See Wolff Shoe, 141 F.3d at 1122-23; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112 F.3d at 1558-60; see Cust.
HQ 228929, supra note 11.
304. See S. REP., supra note 6, at 32 (cited in Cemex, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 n.5 (citing Dal-
Tile Corp., 829 F. Supp at 399). See also Int'l Trading, 281 F.3d at 1272; Cherry Hill Textiles, 112
F.3d at 1559.
305. Remedies available under 19 U.S.C. § 1520 do not appear to have any effect on deemed
liquidation. Under § 1520, an importer may request reliquidation to correct mistakes of fact, clerical
errors, or other inadvertences in Customs liquidation decisions within one year of liquidation. 19
U.S.C. §1520(c)(1)(2005); U.S. Customs Headquarters Ruling Letter HQ 230116 (Jan. 29, 2004),
available at HQ 230116 (Westlaw); Executone Info. Sys. v. United States, 96 F.3d 1383, 1386 (Fed.
Cir. 1996). In Norsk Hydro, the CIT raised the possibility that a Customs notice that a particular
entry has been deemed liquidation could be challenged under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c). Norsk Hydro,
350 F. Supp. 2d at 1178-79. The CIT stated that "Customs' failure to liquidated entries in accor-
dance with Commerce's instructions cannot be categorized as a mistake of fact or a clerical error
[but that] liquidation by operation of law may result from inadvertence." Id. at 1179. According to
the CIT, an importer may challenge such inadvertence under § 1520(c)(1). It is unclear what type of
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A newly-created administrative remedy could come in a number of
different forms. One possibility would be to allow Customs to undo
deemed liquidation and providing importers with an opportunity to pro-
test deemed liquidation. The problem with this approach is that the pro-
test remedy should only be available for importers who have diligently
participated in the liquidation protest. It should not be an avenue for an
importer asleep at the wheel to undo a negative consequence cause by the
importer's own failure to act. Another possibility would be to allow an
importer to file a request for expedited liquidation or some form of an-
ticipatory, administrative protest shortly before deemed liquidation oc-
curs. That way, Customs would be alerted of the pending deemed liqui-
dation and could take appropriate action. Under the latter approach, an
importer would have provided proof that it had diligently monitored its
entries.
B. An Administrative Remedy for Representatives of U.S. Industry
Antidumping proceedings are intended to protect U.S. industry from
unfairly traded imports.30 6 The antidumping duties are intended to level
the playing field by forcing an increase in the price of foreign, dumped
goods.30 7 To a certain extent, U.S. industry has a "right" to expect that
the protection it has been afforded under the statutes is implemented. If
deemed liquidation occurs in the case of underpayment, U.S. industry
has lost part of the protection it was entitled to because the foreign goods
were not subject to as high of a duty as they should have been.308 In ad-
dition, U.S. industry has a direct financial stake in the liquidation process
as long as the Byrd Amendment remains in effect because any antidump-
ing duties collected will be distributed to the affected U.S. industry.
309
Accordingly, U.S. industry has a vested interest in the correct liquidation
of entries subject to antidumping duties (at least in the underpayment
situation).
U.S industry plays a key role in antidumping investigations and ad-
ministrative reviews. 3  However, it has no influence over the liquidation
"inadvertences" would be challengeable under § 1520, especially in light of the consistent statements
by courts and Customs that deemed liquidation cannot be protested or undone once it has occurred.
306. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Insulating Domestic Policy Through International Legal
Minimalism: A Re-characterization of the Foreign Affairs Trade Doctrine, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 1, 67 (2004) ("Both anti-dumping law and presidential constitutional and legal authority over
foreign commerce were increasingly deployed to protect domestic industries.").
307. See, e.g., Alan F. Holmer et al., Enacted and Rejected Amendments to the Antidumping
Law: In Implementation or Contravention of the Antidumping Agreement?, 29 INT'L L. 483, 507
(1995) ("The antidumping law is not intended as a revenue raiser for the government but as a reme-
dial provision to 'level the playing field."').
308. Conversely, if deemed liquidation occurs in the case of overpayment, U.S. industry has
received more protection than it was entitled to and also, currently, perhaps a direct benefit in the
form of Byrd Amendment disbursements.
309. See 19 U.S.C. §1675c (2005).
310. For example, U.S. industry almost always is the initiator of an antidumping investigation.
See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 26 (1995)
("Although the DOC may initiate an antidumping action, in almost every case an interested party
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phase of antidumping proceedings. Once the DOC has issued its final
determination of duty liability in an administrative review, the U.S. in-
dustry has no available administrative remedies to safeguard its interest
in accurate liquidation because U.S. industry does not have standing311 to
file a Customs protest of incorrect liquidation.1 2 Instead, standing to file
Customs protests under Section 1514 is reserved to, inter alia, import-
ers.
3 13
From the U.S. industry's standpoint, this lack of standing to protest
erroneous Customs decision may seem problematic as U.S. industry can-
not enforce the protection from unfair imports afforded to it under the
U.S. antidumping statutes. For that reason, U.S. industry potentially
should be allowed to protest the accuracy of the liquidation process as
well as deemed liquidation.
However, there are multiple, meritorious reasons not to allow repre-
sentatives of U.S. industry such an administrative remedy. First, the
deemed liquidation provision was created to protect importers and not
the U.S. industry.314 Second, U.S. industry has an incentive to bring an-
tidumping cases regardless of their objective merits because the anti-
dumping procedure is heavily biased in favor of U.S. industry. By bring-
ing a case, U.S. industry gains immediate, albeit temporary, protection
from foreign goods by imposition of temporary duties and by creating
uncertainty about supply in the market. Third, allowing U.S. industry to
intervene in the liquidation process would increase the workload of Cus-
toms by adding administrative cost to the liquidation process. Such in-
tervention might also lead to additional delays if Customs would be
forced to adjudicate an adversarial proceeding between importers and
U.S. industry. In addition, allowing such protest might inject an adver-
sarial aspect into the process, forcing both importers and representatives
of U.S. industry to incur substantial costs in legal representation during
the process. Of course, it is likely that importers would have legal repre-
sentation anyway as importers currently have access to limited adminis-
trative remedies during the process. Fourth, another reason to leave U.S.
industry out of the liquidation process is that its interests are represented
by the U.S. government. Finally, representatives of U.S. industry should
not be allowed to take part in the liquidation process because the infor-
mation involved in Customs transactions is confidential business infor-
mation. Giving U.S. industry access to this information would greatly
files a petition."). U.S. industry also works intimately with the DOC during investigations and
administrative reviews to safeguard its interests.
311. The word "standing" as used in this article refers to a particular party's ability to chal-
lenge agency action and is not intended to raise issues relating to the legal concept of standing.
312. Of course, U.S. industry has the ability to request that the CIT enforce decisions by the
DOC or prior court decisions. See, e.g., Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1325.
313. 19 U.S.C. §1514(c)(2) (1994). See also Cemex, 384 F.3d at 1323 n.9; Cemex, 279 F.
Supp. 2d at 1362.
314. See H.R. REP., supra note 85, at 4.
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harm the competitive position of importers and foreign manufacturers.
Indeed, during antidumping proceedings similar information, so called
business proprietary information, is protected by administrative protec-
tive orders and access to it is only given to the parties' counsel; U.S. in-
dustry does not have access to it even during antidumping proceed-
ings.315 While it is theoretically possible to institute an administrative
protective order system to protect information involved in the liquidation
process, it is not administratively wise. The costs associated therewith
would be high, both for Customs and the parties involved. For these
reasons, representatives of U.S. industry should not be allowed to par-
ticipate in the liquidation process.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The DOC and Customs' delays are the source of the problems in the
liquidation process. While courts work under the assumption that admin-
istrative agencies act diligently, it is safe to assume that the delays of the
past will continue in the future. Therefore, the governing statutes must
be amended to eliminate the negative effects of agency delay. First, the
statutes must be amended to provide deadlines within which the DOC
must publish notice of the final results of administrative reviews and
issue liquidation instructions to Customs. Such deadlines are common in
other U.S. trade and Customs law provisions and would provide the
DOC with an unambiguous directive to act. Second, the statutes must be
amended to provide consequences for the DOC's failure to meet these
deadlines. Negative consequences should apply only against the gov-
ernment because the government is the least-cost-avoider as the delays
are within its exclusive control. Third, the statutes must be amended to
provide an administrative remedy for importers to either prevent deemed
liquidation from occurring or to alleviate negative consequences once it
has occurred. Currently, there are no administrative remedies. In addi-
tion, the judicial remedies available are inadequate to safeguard the in-
terests of the involved parties.
Accurately predicting the possibility of a statutory reform is impos-
sible. Congress is a political entity and the success of any statutory
amendment will depend on the perceived benefits and costs to its politi-
cal constituencies. Traditionally, Congress has taken a pro-U.S. industry
stance in enacting U.S. trade laws. Most likely, the amendments sug-
gested in this article would be perceived to be in the main interest of im-
porters and foreign manufacturers. Therefore, it may be politically costly
for Congress to even propose amendments. It is possible that interna-
tional pressure to reform may assist Congress in gaining the necessary
momentum. The United States is currently part of the Doha Round of
315. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b)-(c) (2005); 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.304-06 (2005).
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trade negotiations under the auspice of the WTO. 3 6  The suggested
amendments may form part of a larger reform package to implement the
results of those trade negotiations. However, Congress has shown little
ability to repeal the controversial Byrd Amendment despite international
pressure and a directive to do so from the WTO.31 7 In addition, the cur-
rent record trade deficit and growing dissatisfaction with the WTO in
Congress may indicate a current trend towards isolation and prejudice
against foreign imports. At the same time, members of Congress fre-
quently take positions which can be dismissed as political rhetoric in-
tended to satisfy a particular political constituency. In light of this, a
pro-import statutory amendment is politically challenging to achieve but
not impossible.
316. The WTO landed its latest round of trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar in November 2001.
The negotiations cover, among other things, trade in goods, services and issues specifically related to
agriculture.
317. See supra note 99.

